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THE TOBACCO CONTROL ACT’S
PMTA & MRTP PROVISIONS MEAN
TO PROTECT THE USA FROM ANY
NEW TOBACCO PRODUCTS THAT
WILL NOT REDUCE HEALTH HARMS
– BUT FDA ISN’T COOPERATING
ERIC N. LINDBLOM*
ABSTRACT
The Premarket Tobacco Product Application (PMTA) provisions in the
U.S. Tobacco Control Act (TCA) prohibit any new or substantially different
types or brands of tobacco products from entering the U.S. market unless FDA
first finds that allowing the product’s marketing is “appropriate for the protection
of the public health.” Similarly, the Act’s Modified Risk Tobacco Product
(MRTP) provisions prohibit the marketing of any tobacco product with
modified-risk claims unless FDA first finds that allowing such marketing will
reduce health harms and risks to the population as a whole. At a minimum, these
public health standards require FDA to determine that allowing the new tobacco
product marketing will produce harm reductions (e.g., from prompting smokers
to switch to the less-harmful product) which are larger than any new related
health harms (e.g., from increasing youth use or prompting smokers to switch
instead of quitting all use). Because of the inevitable uncertainties when trying
to predict how new tobacco product marketing will affect future consumer
behavior and health, the TCA gives FDA considerable discretion as to how it
will administer the PMTA and MRTP procedures to protect the public health. As
this article explains, however, FDA has failed to exercise that discretion
appropriately, and has violated the TCA’s public health standard and other
applicable laws in the permissive PMTA and MRTP orders it has issued to date.
© 2021 Eric N. Lindblom.
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In particular, the permissive PMTA and MRTP orders FDA has issued
have: (a) failed to explain how FDA is interpreting and applying the TCA’s
public health standard; (b) were not sufficiently comprehensive or rigorous to
support a reasonable determination that the orders were “appropriate for the
protection of the public health” under any possible interpretation of the standard;
and (c) failed to include readily available restrictions and requirements on the
products and their labeling, marketing, and sale in the final orders to prevent
unnecessary individual and public health harms and risks.
These orders and FDA’s Final PMTA Guidance regarding e-cigarettes and
Proposed PMTA Rule indicate that these agency failings could continue in the
future; and the stakes are high. Numerous applications for new PMTA and
MRTP orders are already pending, and FDA will be facing a wave of new
applications to meet a court-ordered deadline for all e-cigarettes and certain other
tobacco products currently on the U.S. market to apply for PMTA orders. If FDA
does not begin to comply with applicable legal standards and act more
responsibly to protect the public health, it could be forced to do so. Based on the
analysis presented here, successful legal challenges could come either from
members of the tobacco industry legally challenging permissive orders given to
their competitors or from public health groups that want to strike down any
PMTA or MRTP orders that directly cause unnecessary health harms or risks.
I. BACKGROUND
Under the Tobacco Control Act (TCA), no new or substantially changed
tobacco products, including any new or substantially changed individual brands
or sub-brands, that were not on the U.S. market on February 15, 2007 may be
legally marketed or sold in the United States unless they first obtain an order
from FDA allowing them on the market.1 To secure a permissive order, the
tobacco product manufacturer (or importer) must either submit an application
establishing that the product is “substantially equivalent” to a product that was
legally on the U.S. market on February 15, 2007,2 or must submit a Premarket
Tobacco Product Application (PMTA) and secure an order from FDA finding
that it would be “appropriate for the protection of the public health” to allow the
new or substantially changed tobacco product to be marketed in the United
States.3 The TCA’s PMTA provisions were designed, primarily, to prevent any

1. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31 [hereinafter TCA],
sec. 1, tit. I, § 101–110, 123 Stat. 1776, 1783–1857 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387–387t (2012)).
Title I of the Family Smoking and Tobacco Control Act amends the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA). Id.
2. Id. sec. 101, § 905(j) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387e(j)).
3. Id. sec. 101, § 910(c) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387j(c)).
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new types or variants of tobacco products appearing in the U.S. market that could
increase public health harms.4
Initially, only cigarettes, smokeless tobacco products, and roll-your-own
tobacco for cigarette smoking, and reduced-risk claims relating to those products,
were subject to the TCA.5 But the TCA empowered FDA to “deem” any or all
other tobacco products to be under its tobacco control jurisdiction, as well, and
FDA issued a rule to do that, effective August 8, 2016.6 Because of other
provisions in the TCA, all the newly deemed cigars, pipe tobaccos, e-cigarettes,
and other nicotine-based tobacco products that had not been on the U.S. market
as of February 15, 2007 immediately became new tobacco products that required
a permissive new product order to stay on market legally.7 To address this odd
situation, FDA’s Deeming Rule announced that it would exercise its enforcement
discretion to allow these products to stay on the market so long as they submitted
substantial equivalence (SE) applications by February 10, 2018 or PMTA
applications by August 10, 2018.8 FDA later extended those deadlines to August
10, 2022 for SE or PMTA applications for e-cigarettes and August 2021 for SE
or PMTA applications for the newly deemed combustible products.9 However,
in response to a lawsuit by a collection of public health groups, a federal district
court in May 2019 issued an order rejecting FDA’s general policy of not
requiring new product applications from the newly deemed tobacco products
until 2022 or 2021 as an improper use of agency enforcement discretion.10 The
court subsequently ordered that the SE or PMTA applications must be submitted
no later than May 12, 2020, which was later extended to September 9, 2020, with
FDA generally required to rule on the applications within a year of receipt.11
4. Id. § 3 (highlighting the purpose of the TCA, including to ensure oversight of the development
and introduction of tobacco products).
5. See id. sec. 101, § 901(b) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387a(b)) (defining the applicability of the
FDA’s authority).
6. Id.; FDA Deeming Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,974 (May 10, 2016) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 1100,
1140, 1143).
7. See FDA Deeming Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. at 28,977, 29,009–10.
8. Id. at 28,974, 29,011.
9. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EXTENSION OF CERTAIN TOBACCO PRODUCT COMPLIANCE
DEADLINES RELATED TO THE FINAL DEEMING RULE: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY i, 9 (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/105346/download. It also appears that FDA is exercising its enforcement
discretion not to take any action against a number of new and substantially changed e-cigarettes that
have appeared on the market since the Deeming Rule went into effect. While the FDA has
acknowledged this widespread issue, it has not stated or explained any such enforcement discretion
policy in any public statements or formal documents. See, e.g., Press Release, Campaign for TobaccoFree Kids, Leading Health Groups Urge FDA to Stop Sales of New, Juul-Like E-Cigarettes Illegally
Introduced Without Agency Review (Aug. 7, 2018), www.tobaccofreekids.org/pressreleases/2018_08_07_new_ecig_products.
10. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. FDA, 379 F. Supp. 3d 461, 497–98 (D. Md., 2019).
11. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. FDA, 399 F. Supp. 3d 479, 487 (D. Md., 2019); appeal dismissed as
moot, In re Cigar Ass’n of Am., 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 14205 (4th Cir. May 4, 2020); see also FDA
News Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: Court Grants FDA’s
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Because of the difficulty in finding a substantially equivalent e-cigarette
that was on the U.S. market on February 15, 2007 which might support an SE
application, FDA expects that e-cigarette manufacturers will submit PMTA
applications.12 Although FDA does not publicly disclose all PMTA submissions,
some PMTAs for major e-cigarette brands have already been submitted since the
court issued its order.13 While the e-cigarettes illegally on the U.S. market have
been generally free from any enforcement efforts for failing to have required new
product orders, FDA has initiated enforcement actions against some e-cigarettes
for violating other TCA requirements.14 Because of continued increases in youth
use of e-cigarettes, in September 2019, President Trump and FDA announced
that, to prevent youth use, the agency would soon begin exercising its discretion
to take enforcement action, before the September application deadline, against
any e-cigarettes on the market without a permissive PMTA or SE order that have
any added flavors.15 But in response to industry and user pressure, President
Trump changed his mind, and FDA subsequently announced that it will remove
Request for Extension of Premarket Review Submission Deadline for Certain Tobacco Products Because
of Impacts from COVID-19, Food & Drug Admin. (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-court-grants-fdas-request-extensionpremarket-review-submission-deadline.
12. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PREMARKET TOBACCO PRODUCT APPLICATIONS FOR
ELECTRONIC NICOTINE DELIVERY SYSTEMS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/127853/download [hereinafter Final PMTA Guidance]. Many cigars and
pipe tobacco products, however, will be able to submit SE applications, as there were numerous cigar
and pipe tobacco products on the market on February 15, 2007 that could be used as SE predicates.
However, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for any addictive cigar or other smoked
tobacco product that could not secure an SE order (e.g., cigars or pipe tobacco with flavors or other
product characteristics not on the market in 2007) to secure a PMTA order, instead. That would require
a showing that allowing the addictive, smoked cigar on the market would be “appropriate for the
protection of the public health.” See id. at 11–16. Yet it is hard to imagine any way a cigar could be
smoked that could significantly reduce health harms among existing smokers, much less new initiates, or
any way a cigar’s marketing could reduce overall smoking or otherwise produce a net public health gain.
13. See, e.g., Press Release, Reynolds Am. Inc., Reynolds American Inc. Submits Premarket
Tobacco Product Application for VUSE products (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/reynolds-american-inc-submits-premarket-tobacco-product-application-for-vuse-products300937224.html (stating that Reynolds American submitted a PMTA for its VUSE e-cigarette product).
See also Premarket Tobacco Product Marketing Orders, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/premarket-tobacco-product-applications/premarket-tobacco-productmarketing-orders (last visited July 15, 2020) (listing FDA’s issued premarket tobacco product marketing
orders); see also Marketing Orders for SE, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., www.fda.gov/tobaccoproducts/substantial-equivalence/marketing-orders-se (last visited July 15, 2020) (listing FDA’s issued
substantial equivalence marketing orders).
14. See, e.g., Warning Letters and Civil Money Penalties Issued to Retailers for Selling JUUL and
Other E-Cigarettes to Minors, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/ctpnewsroom/warning-letters-and-civil-money-penalties-issued-retailers-selling-juul-and-other-e-cigarettes
(last visited July 15, 2020).
15. See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Trump Administration Combating Epidemic of
Youth E-Cigarette Use with Plan to Clear Market of Unauthorized, Non-Tobacco-Flavored E-Cigarette
Products (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/trumpadministration-combating-epidemic-youth-e-cigarette-use-plan-clear-market-unauthorized-non.
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from the market only those e-cigarettes without permissive PMTA orders that
are cartridge-based (such as Juul e-cigarettes) and have flavors other than
menthol or tobacco.16
As of July 2020, FDA has considered only a small number of PMTAs and
granted permissive PMTA orders for: (1) eight similar Swedish Match snus
smokeless tobacco products, (2) a Philip Morris IQOS “heat-not-burn” tobacco
products system with several different types of IQOS heatsticks, and (3) two 22nd
Century Group very-low-nicotine cigarettes.17 Hundreds of applications for
additional PMTA orders are pending;18 and hundreds more will likely be
submitted by the court-ordered deadline, even if applications were submitted for
only a fraction of the thousands of different brands, sub-brands, and variants of
e-cigarettes and e-cigarette liquids currently sold in the United States.19
It is also possible that some of the e-cigarette products submitting PMTAs
will also submit modified-risk-tobacco-product (MRTP) applications to obtain
FDA permission to make reduced-risk or reduced-exposure claims in their
labeling or advertising.20 To issue a permissive MRTP order, FDA must
determine, first, that using the proposed e-cigarette instead of the comparison
16. See Annie Karni et al., Trump Retreats From Flavor Ban for E-Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/17/health/trump-vaping-ban.html (describing the political
pressure put on the President causing him to retract his prior commitment); see also Nathaniel Weixel,
Top Trump official questions FDA tobacco oversight as vaping ban looms, THE HILL (Nov. 8, 2019),
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/469618-top-white-house-official-questions-fda-tobacco-role-asvaping-ban-looms (noting statements made by Trump officials declaring that FDA regulation of tobacco
is a “waste of time”); see also User Clip: Joe Grogan – White House Domestic Policy Council –
Discusses e-cigarette Regulation (CSPAN television broadcast clip Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.cspan.org/video/?c4828413/user-clip-joe-grogan-white-house-domestic-policy-council (discussing
growing issues revolving around e-cigarette regulation); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Guidance
Document: Enforcement Priorities for Electronic Nicotine Delivery System (ENDS) and Other Deemed
Products on the Market Without Premarket Authorization, Guidance for Industry (April 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/enforcement-prioritieselectronic-nicotine-delivery-system-ends-and-other-deemed-products-market.
17. Premarket Tobacco Product Marketing Orders, supra note 13. The Philip Morris of the IQOS
PMTA is Philip Morris Products S.A., a subsidiary of Philip Morris International (PMI). IQOS will be
distributed in the United States through an agreement between PMI and Altria Client Services LLC
(Altria), whereby Altria and its Philip Morris USA subsidiary are licensed to distribute and sell IQOS in
the U.S.
18. Tobacco Product Marketing Orders, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/market-and-distribute-tobacco-product/tobacco-productmarketing-orders.
19. See Shu-Hong Zhu et al., Four Hundred and Sixty Brands of E-cigarettes and Counting:
Implications for Product Regulation, 23 TOBACCO CONTROL iii3 (2014)
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4078673/pdf/tobaccocontrol-2014-051670.pdf; Greta
Hsu et al., Evolution of Electronic Cigarette Brands From 2013-2014 to 2016-2017: Analysis of Brand
Websites, 20 J. MED. INTERNET RES. e80 (2018)
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5869180/?report=classic.
20. See Modified Risk Tobacco Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/advertising-and-promotion/modified-risk-tobaccoproducts#Overview (last visited July 15, 2020).
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product (e.g., regular cigarettes) will actually significantly reduce user health
harms or risks or reduce exposure to the specified harmful or potentially harmful
constituents (e.g., nitrosamines, acrolein, naphthalene); and, second, that
allowing the MRTP e-cigarette on the market with the claim will “benefit the
health of the population as a whole” (relative-risk claims) or be “appropriate to
promote the public health” (relative-exposure claims).21 These MRTP public
health standards directly parallel the appropriate-for-the-protection-of-thepublic-health standard that applies to PMTA orders, with all of them focusing
exclusively on the impacts of the regulatory action on the health risks and harms
of the population as a whole, taking into account both users of tobacco products
and persons who do not currently use tobacco products, and also considering
other behavioral impacts.22
No MRTP applications have yet been submitted for any e-cigarettes.23
However, FDA issued its first permissive MRTP order, for the Swedish Match
snus, in October 2019, and a second permissive MRTP order, for the PMTA
IQOS products, in July 2020, and additional MRTP applications are pending for
Copenhagen moist snuff smokeless tobacco products, Camel snus, and 22nd
Century Group’s very-low-nicotine cigarettes.24

21. TCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31, sec. 101, § 911(g), 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §
387k(g) (2012)). To issue a permissive MRTP order, FDA must also make some other secondary or
related findings. Id.
22. See id. (regarding the standard as it applies to MRTP orders; cf. id. § 910(c)(4) (codified at §
387j(c)(4)) (regarding the standard as it applies to PMTA orders); Eric N. Lindblom, What Is
‘Appropriate for the Protection of the Public Health’ Under the U.S. Tobacco Control Act, 74 FOOD &
DRUG L. J. 523, 532 (June 2020). If anything, the standard for issuing MRTP orders requires even
stronger likelihoods of producing solid public gains than for PMTA orders because of the MRTP text’s
reference to how allowing the MRTP must “benefit” the health of the population as a whole or
“promote” the public health, while the PMTA text says that PMTA orders must only be “appropriate”
for “protecting” the public health. For simplicity’s sake, this paper will refer to the public health
standards that apply to PMTA and MRTP orders, collectively, as AFPPH, except when any differences
in the statutory text becomes relevant to the paper’s analysis.
23. See Modified Risk Tobacco Products, supra note 20.
24. See id.; Modified Risk Orders, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., www.fda.gov/tobaccoproducts/advertising-and-promotion/modified-risk-orders (last visited July 15, 2020). A single Order
Letter covers all the MRTP Swedish Match snus, allowing them to be marketed with the following
reduced-risk claim: “Using General Snus instead of cigarettes puts you at a lower risk of mouth cancer,
heart disease, lung cancer, stroke, emphysema, and chronic bronchitis.” Modified Risk Granted Orders ‒
‒ Risk Modification, Letter from Matthew R. Holman, Dir., Office of Sci., Ctr. for Tobacco Prods., to
Gerard Roerty, Vice President, Swedish Match USA, Inc. (Oct. 22, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/131922/download [hereinafter Snus MRTP Order]. Another single Order
Letter covers all the IQOS products allowing them to be marketed with reduced exposure (but not
reduced risk) claims. Modified Risk Granted Orders—Exposure Modification, Letter from Matthew R.
Holman, Dir., Office of Sci., Ctr. for Tobacco Prods., to Philip Morris Products, S.A. (July 7, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/media/139797/download [hereinafter IQOS MRTP Order].
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II. WHAT LEGAL STANDARDS APPLY TO PMTA AND MRTP APPLICATIONS?
When FDA evaluates PMTA or MRTP applications to determine whether
issuing a permissive order would be “appropriate for the protection of the public
health” (AFPPH), it is clear from the Tobacco Control Act that FDA may
consider only the order’s impact on the public health (i.e., on the health risks and
harms to the population as a whole).25 Non-health impacts are not directly
relevant.26 Evaluating possible public health impacts necessarily includes FDA’s
consideration of how the availability and marketing of the new PMTA or MRTP
products might influence youth and adult tobacco-product initiation, cessation,
switching, dual use, consumption levels, relapse, and other related behaviors that
have public health consequences.27 However, any impacts on illicit trade,
government or industry costs and other burdens, or personal autonomy could be
relevant to FDA’s related AFPPH determinations only to the extent that they also
produced public health consequences.28
By requiring FDA to focus exclusively on the health harms and risks to the
population as a whole, the Act also does not allow FDA to give more weight to
health harms or harm reductions experienced by youths compared to those
experienced by adults when determining net public health impacts.29 Nor does
the Act allow FDA to give more weight to health harms or harm reductions
among any specific sub-populations or disadvantaged groups compared to
others.30 For FDA’s AFPPH determinations, the overriding concern must be the
net impact on the health risks and harms to the population as a whole.31 But the
impacts of a PMTA or MRTP order on the health harms and risks of youth, other

25. TCA sec. 101, § 911(g) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387k(g)); id. sec. 101, § 910(c)(4) (codified at
§ 387j(c)(40)).
26. Id.; Lindblom, supra note 22, at 533–34, 540.
27. TCA sec. 101, § 911(g)(4) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387k(g)(4)); id. sec. 101, § 910(c)(4)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387j(c)(4)).
28. Lindblom, supra note 22, at 541.
29. Id. at 546. In an Appendix to the Decision Summary for its PMTA Order allowing the IQOS
tobacco products onto the U.S. market, FDA refers to “FDA’s statutory mandate to protect young people
from the dangers of tobacco use,” but FDA cites no sources and does not state whether it interprets the
statute as placing a higher priority on reducing health harms to youth than reducing health harms to
adults. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., No. PM0000424–PM0000426, PM0000479, PMTA COVERSHEET:
TECHNICAL PROJECT LEAD REVIEW (TPL) 111, 120 (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/124247/download [hereinafter IQOS PMTA Decision Summary]. Nor has
FDA elsewhere attempted to provide any reasoned interpretation of the AFPPH standard that would
place a greater priority on preventing and reducing harms to youth compared to harms to adults; and the
TCA does not appear to create any such priority or directly allow it. Lindblom, supra note 22, at 547–
49. However, preventing a youth from ever becoming a regular tobacco product user will, on average,
prevent considerably more harm than the harm reductions secured by prompting an adult user of the
same type of tobacco product to quit all use, given that the adult user has already been harmed by that
tobacco use.
30. Lindblom, supra note 22, at 543–46.
31. Id. at 546.
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vulnerable subpopulations, disadvantaged subpopulations, and other
subpopulations are all relevant to the extent they factor into determining the
overall impact on the health of the population as a whole.32
Despite these limits on what FDA may consider, making AFPPH
determinations can be complicated when it is not clear how harmful the use of
the new PMTA or MRTP products will be to brand-new youth or adult tobacco
product users, those who switch from using other tobacco product use, dual users,
or users of multiple tobacco-nicotine products, both generally and in comparison
to other types of tobacco use. Another major complication comes from the
inescapable uncertainties in predicting how the manufacturers will market the
new PMTA or MRTP tobacco products in the future, how other industry
members will respond, how that marketing will affect youth and adult user and
nonuser behaviors, and how those future behavior changes will impact the
individual health of users and exposed nonusers and, consequently, the public
health.
Moreover, even if FDA developed a reasonable way to make these
necessary estimates of future health impacts, the TCA does not tell FDA whether
issuing a permissive PMTA or MRTP could still be AFPPH if FDA determines
that allowing the new products on the market is likely to create a net public health
gain but will also produce brand-new individual or subpopulation health harms
or will also create a risk of producing a negative net public health impact. Even
if we assume that the TCA’s silence in this regard could, in some situations,
allow a new PMTA or MRTP product on the market even when FDA determined
it would produce some new health harms or create a risk of a negative net impact
on the public health, the Act is silent as to how large the likelihood and size of
the expected public health gains from allowing the new product on the market
would have to be to make incurring those new harms or running the risk of new
net public health harms AFPPH.
These complications are simplified somewhat by the fact that the TCA
through its silences and ambiguities leaves FDA with substantial discretion to
determine how it will interpret and apply the AFPPH standard (within the
framework established by the TCA), and how it will handle the significant
32. See id. at 546, 549. As discussed more fully below, impacts on vulnerable or disadvantaged
subpopulations could also become relevant to AFPPH determinations when FDA is deciding whether
the expected net public health gains from a PMTA or MRTP order are worth running a related risk of
producing a negative net public health impact, instead (e.g., if the harms from the possible negative
impact would be centered primarily on vulnerable or disadvantaged subpopulations while the expected
health gains are centered primarily on more advantaged subpopulations). Similarly, a PMTA or MRTP
order that might qualify as AFPPH under the TCA’s population-as-a-whole criteria could still be legally
invalid if its negative impacts on health disparities or inequities, its health impacts on specific
subpopulations, or its negative non-health impacts, were so large and disproportionate that they made
the order “arbitrary or capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act despite its expected net
public health gains. See TCA sec. 101, § 912(b) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387l(b)); Administrative
Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1966).
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uncertainties inherent in trying to determine what public health and other relevant
impacts might be produced by the marketing of a tobacco product receiving a
permissive PMTA or MRTP order.33
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), however, any such FDA
actions must not be “arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”34
Accordingly, an FDA interpretation of the AFPPH standard or an FDA
determination that a PMTA or MRTP order was AFPPH could be struck down if
a court determined that the FDA process for making that interpretation or
determination was seriously flawed or the end result was irrational,
incomprehensible, or clearly wrong.35 In addition, an otherwise AFPPH PMTA
or MRTP order could also be found “arbitrary or capricious” if FDA failed to
take advantage of readily available means to modify the order to avoid or reduce
any unnecessary individual or public health harms or risks, or to reduce certain
undesirable non-health costs (at least when that could be done without also
disproportionately reducing the likelihood or size of the desired net public health
gains).36 Beyond that, the APA places very few constraints on how FDA might
exercise its discretion under the TCA, as long as FDA follows any statuterequired procedures; considers relevant available evidence and analysis,
including contrary facts, analyses, and alternatives; and provides a reasonable
explanation for its decisions.37
33. See Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 326 (2014) (“Agencies exercise
discretion only in the interstices created by statutory silence or ambiguity”); United States v. Bean, 537
U.S. 71, 77 (2002) (“the ‘public interest’ standard calls for an inherently policy-based decision best left
in the hands of an agency”); Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“Rather, if
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute”); WildEarth Guardians v.
EPA, 728 F.3d 1074, 1082 (10th Cir. 2013) (explaining an agency “is entitled to considerable judicial
deference”). See also Lindblom, supra note 22, at 550–51.
34. Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1966); TCA sec. 101, § 912(b) (codified at
21 U.S.C. § 387l(b)).
35. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 (2016)
(stating that agency must examine relevant considerations and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
actions, showing a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made); Nat’l Ass’n of
Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658–59 (2007) (explaining that an agency can
change its mind throughout the rulemaking process so long as proper procedures were followed and its
rationale can be followed); Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 110 (1st Cir.
1997) (discussing whether the decision of the Secretary of Commerce “exercised his discretion in an
irrational, mindless, or whimsical manner”); U.S. Dep’t of Justice Fed. Bureau of Prisons Fed. Corr.
Complex v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 737 F.3d 779, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (clarifying that a court
reviewing an agency’s action must consider if the decision was an unexplained departure from previous
agency action, how coherent the decision was, and whether deference is owed to the agency’s expertise).
See generally Lindblom, supra note 22.
36. See State of La. ex rel. Guste v. Verity, 853 F.2d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 1988); S. Terminal Corp. v.
EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 655–56, 676 (1st Cir. 1974). See Lindblom, supra note 22, at 568.
37. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 782. When an
agency fails to fully articulate the reasons for its decision, it will not be found “arbitrary or capricious” if
the court “can reasonably discern the basis for the agency’s action.” Am. Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA,
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For example, FDA might reasonably determine that a permissive PMTA or
MRTP order could not be AFPPH if it would produce large new individual or
subpopulation health harms (even if it would produce larger net public health
gains) or if it created a significant risk of producing a non-trivial net increase in
public health harms (even if it were more likely to create a net public health gain)
– so long as FDA explained the basis for its decision and showed that it had
considered contrary evidence and analysis. Or FDA might follow the same
process to make a reasonable determination that an order is AFPPH so long as
the likelihood and size of its expected net public health benefit were at least some
multiple larger than both any new health harms it might cause and the likelihood
and size of any possible negative public health impact. However, even if FDA
clearly explained its reasoning and showed that it had considered contrary
positions, it is likely the courts would still find FDA “arbitrary or capricious” if
FDA’s conclusion contradicted common sense (e.g., if FDA determined that a
permissive PMTA or MRTP order could be AFPPH even if it were just as likely
or more likely to create a negative net public health impact as a comparable or
smaller positive one).38
So far, however, FDA has not taken any public action to fill in the gaps in
the AFPPH standard left by the statute, either generally or as it relates to PMTA
or MRTP orders.39 Nor has FDA clearly explained how it is applying the AFPPH
standard when evaluating PMTA or MRTP applications or issuing related orders,
much less provide a reasoned justification for its interpretation and application
of the standard in the documentation relating to the orders it has issued.
No matter how FDA (or the courts) ultimately refine or clarify the AFPPH
standard in the context of PMTA or MRTP orders, FDA would need to develop
viable estimates of the likelihood and size of the different possible net public
health impacts a permissive order might produce to determine whether issuing it
meets the AFPPH standard. At a minimum, FDA would need to determine
whether, under any reasonably possible worst-case scenario, the availability and

526 F.2d 1027, 1047 (3rd Cir. 1975) (citing Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,
Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)). See also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 513–14 (2009)
(courts should “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be
discerned”) (citing Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286
(1974)). But see Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2127 (2016) (“It is not the role of
the courts to speculate on reasons that might have supported an agency’s decision. [W]e may not supply
a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.”) (quoting Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)); Judulang v. Holder, 565
U.S. 42, 53 (2011) (“When reviewing an agency action, we must assess, among other matters, ‘whether
the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error
of judgment.’ That task involves examining the reasons for agency decisions—or, as the case may be,
the absence of such reasons.”) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n 463 U.S. 29 at 43) (internal citations
omitted).
38. See Lindblom, supra note 22, at 570–71.
39. Id. at 573–77.
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marketing of the product might produce a non-trivial negative net public health
impact. Assuming that the standard will be interpreted to allow at least some risk
of a net public health loss, FDA would then need to determine whether issuing a
permissive order would produce a sufficiently higher likelihood of producing a
large-enough net public health gain to make running the risk of the new public
health loss AFPPH.40
The inherent difficulties in predicting future industry and consumer
behavior, coupled with gaps in available research, make developing precise
reliable estimates of the future public health impacts from issuing a permissive
PMTA or MRTP order difficult, if not impossible. Despite these challenges,
FDA could reasonably exercise its discretion to rely on any reasonable process
for estimating the range of reasonably possible future health impacts – based on
available or readily developed evidence and expertise – that would be highly
likely to keep not-AFPPH products off the market while still allowing AFPPH
products on. For example, FDA might reasonably determine that using mortality
impacts or using impacts on quality adjusted life years (QALYs) is a valid proxy
for quantifying public health impacts, and that it is reasonable to project those
impacts through using relevant experts’ evidence-based worst-case, best-case,
and most-likely-case estimates relating to product harmfulness, possible harmincreasing consumer uses, and possible consumer harm-reducing uses, including
considerations of different ways the industry might respond.41 FDA might then
develop these estimates informally by having its own tobacco control experts or
hired outside experts review available relevant data, research, and analysis to
develop conclusions regarding the likelihood and size of the permissive order’s
worst possible public health impact and, if negative, compare those estimates to
their conclusions about the likelihood and size of the potential positive impacts.
Or the estimates could be developed through more formal modeling, with expert
elicitations or other reasonable procedures to develop any of the model’s needed
inputs that have uncertain values which could not otherwise be reasonably
quantified.42

40. It is theoretically possible that the worst-case scenario for some permitted PMTA or MRTP
tobacco products would not be negative (i.e., that issuing certain PMTA or MRTP orders could not
possibly produce a negative net public health impact). But issuing a permissive order for an addictive
tobacco product that causes any non-trivial health risks and harms to users would almost certainly
produce at least some risk of producing net public health harms because of the powerful incentives for
manufacturers to maximize sales. Further, permitting a new product could produce net public health
harms because anyone using less-harmful products may switch completely to the new, more-harmful
product and would not have otherwise quit or switched.
41. For examples of such modeling, see, e.g., John La Puma & Edward F. Lawlor, Quality-Adjusted
Life-Years: Ethical Implications for Physicians and Policymakers, 263 JAMA 2917 (1990); Yves
Arrighi et al., To Count or Not to Count Deaths: Reranking Effects in Health Distribution Evaluation,
24 HEALTH ECON. 193, 194 (2015).
42. For examples of such modeling, see M. Granger Morgan, Use (and Abuse) of Expert Elicitation
in Support of Decision Making for Public Policy, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 7176 (2014)

LINDBLOM 1 (DO NOT DELETE)

132

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

1/24/2021 6:51 PM

[VOL. 23:2

As discussed below, however, the permissive PMTA and MRTP orders
FDA issued so far do not indicate that FDA has taken any of these types of
actions when making its AFPPH determinations.43 Nor has FDA issued any
publicly available proposed or final rules or other materials indicating that it will
necessarily do so when evaluating and issuing future PMTA or MRTP orders.44
To be more transparent, create a stronger substantive and legal foundation
for its regulatory actions, and provide needed guidance to tobacco-product
manufacturers, tobacco control researchers, and other interested parties, FDA
should clearly articulate and explain its concept of the AFPPH standard and its
remaining gray areas. In particular, FDA should explain whether it has
determined that it could be AFPPH to allow a new tobacco product on the market
if it also creates new health harms or any significant risk of producing a net
increase in health harms to the population as a whole. If so, FDA should also
explain, in at least general terms, how much larger the likelihood and size of the
potential net public health gains need to be compared to the new health harms or
to the risk and size of the possible net public health harms to make the product’s
marketing AFPPH. Going further, FDA should explain what specific procedures
it has determined can reasonably be used to develop viable estimates of the
possible future behavioral and health impacts from issuing permissive PMTA or
MRPT orders that FDA can and will use to evaluate and determine whether
permitting a tobacco products’ marketing would be AFPPH and not “arbitrary or
capricious.”
As detailed below, FDA’s failure to provide these clarifications and
explanations makes each of the permissive PMTA and MRTP orders it has issued
to date highly vulnerable to legal challenges that could prompt the courts to strike
down the orders as “arbitrary or capricious” or not AFPPH.

(discussing the value in scientific and technical judgments from experts in public policy decision
making); Benjamin J. Apelberg et al., Potential Public Health Effects of Reducing Nicotine Levels in
Cigarettes in the United States, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1725 (2018); David T. Levy et al., Modeling the
Future Effects of a Menthol Ban on Smoking Prevalence and Smoking-Attributable Deaths in the United
States, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1236 (2011).
43. See Premarket Tobacco Product Marketing Orders, supra note 13 (providing information on all
PMTA orders FDA has issued); see also Modified Risk Orders, supra note 20 (providing information on
all MRTP orders issued by FDA).
44. Although FDA has issued a final guidance and a proposed rule relating to PMTAs, neither
requires any of the types of modeling or estimated projections of possible health impacts discussed here
nor indicates that FDA will do such modeling, itself. Final PMTA Guidance, supra note 12; Premarket
Tobacco Product Applications and Recordkeeping Requirements, 84 Fed. Reg. 50,556 (Sept. 25, 2019)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1100, 1107, 1114) [hereinafter Proposed PMTA Rule].
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III. FDA HAS FAILED TO EXPLAIN OR JUSTIFY HOW IT IS INTERPRETING AND
APPLYING THE AFPPH STANDARD WHEN EVALUATING NEW PRODUCT
ORDERS AND ISSUING PMTA ORDERS
FDA has not yet publicly disclosed any deliberative effort it has made to
clarify the gray areas left by the Tobacco Control Act, nor has FDA explained
with any specificity how it has interpreted and applied the AFPPH standard, or
its gray areas, in any of the permissive PMTA or MRTP orders it has issued to
date.45 All FDA does, explicitly, in the PMTA and MRTP decision summaries
45. FDA’s order letters, decision summaries, and other documentation for each of the permissive
PMTA orders it has issued – are available at the FDA website. Premarket Tobacco Product Marketing
Orders supra note 13. The Decision Summary for each of the Swedish Match snus is contained in the
same document. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NO. PM0000010-PM0000017, PREMARKET TOBACCO
APPLICATION (PMTA) TECHNICAL PROJECT LEAD (TPL) REVIEW, 1–3, 8 (2015),
https://www.fda.gov/media/94582/download [hereinafter Snus PMTA Decision Summary] (providing
little AFPPH analysis or explanation). The letter orders for each of the eight snus products are slightly
different, however none provide any explanation or analysis of the AFPPH finding. While each of these
letters are slightly different, for purposes of this article, the marketing order for PM0000010 will serve
as an example representative of the other Snus PMTA Orders. Marketing Order Letter No. PM0000010
from David Ashley, Dir., Office of Sci., Ctr. for Tobacco Prods., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Gerard
Roerty, Vice President, Swedish Match USA, Inc. (2015), https://www.fda.gov/media/94616/download
[hereinafter Snus PMTA Order]. See also Marketing Order Letter No. PM000011 from David Ashley,
Dir., Office of Sci., Ctr. for Tobacco Prods., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Gerard Roerty, Vice
President, Swedish Match USA, Inc. (2015), http://wayback.archiveit.org/7993/20180127062338/https://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/TobaccoProdu
ctReviewEvaluation/UCM472133.pdf; Marketing Order Letter No. PM0000012 from David Ashley,
Dir., Office of Sci., Ctr. for Tobacco Prods., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Gerard Roerty, Vice
President, Swedish Match USA, Inc. (2015),http://wayback.archiveit.org/7993/20180127062340/https://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/TobaccoProdu
ctReviewEvaluation/UCM472134.pdf; Marketing Order Letter No. PM0000013 from David Ashley,
Dir., Office of Sci., Ctr. for Tobacco Prods., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Gerard Roerty, Vice
President, Swedish Match USA, Inc. (2015), http://wayback.archiveit.org/7993/20180127062342/https://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/TobaccoProdu
ctReviewEvaluation/UCM472137.pdf; Marketing Order Letter No. PM0000014 from David Ashley,
Dir., Office of Sci., Ctr. for Tobacco Prods., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Gerard Roerty, Vice
President, Swedish Match USA, Inc. (2015), http://wayback.archiveit.org/7993/20180127062345/https://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/TobaccoProdu
ctReviewEvaluation/UCM472138.pdf; Marketing Order Letter No. PM0000015 from David Ashley,
Dir., Office of Sci., Ctr. for Tobacco Prods., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Gerard Roerty, Vice
President, Swedish Match USA, Inc. (2015), http://wayback.archiveit.org/7993/20180127062347/https://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/TobaccoProdu
ctReviewEvaluation/UCM472140.pdf; Marketing Order Letter No. PM0000016 from David Ashley,
Dir., Office of Sci., Ctr. for Tobacco Prods., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Gerard Roerty, Vice
President, Swedish Match USA, Inc. (2015), http://wayback.archiveit.org/7993/20180127062349/https://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/TobaccoProdu
ctReviewEvaluation/UCM472141.pdf; Marketing Order Letter No. PM0000017 from David Ashley,
Dir., Office of Sci., Ctr. for Tobacco Prods., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Gerard Roerty, Vice
President, Swedish Match USA, Inc. (2015), https://www.fda.gov/media/94633/download. A single
PMTA Decision Summary and single Order letter cover all of the subject IQOS products. IQOS PMTA
Decision Summary, supra note 29; Marketing Order Letter Nos. PM0000424-PM0000426, PM0000479
from Matthew Holman, Dir., Office of Sci., Ctr. for Tobacco Prods., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to
Jeffrey Walker, Chief Exec. Officer, Teton Regulatory Scis., Philip Morris Prods. (2019),
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and orders is restate the TCA text that outlines the AFPPH standard, without
identifying the remaining gray areas or gaps relevant to PMTA determinations
or doing anything to clarify or fill them.46 Accordingly, FDA has either issued
those permissive orders without first clarifying how the AFPPH standard should
be interpreted within the framework created by the TCA and then applying it
https://www.fda.gov/media/94616/download [hereinafter IQOS PMTA Order]. A single Decision
Summary and Order letter covers the two 22nd Century Group low-nicotine cigarettes receiving a PMTA
Order. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Marketing Granted Order Letter Nos. PM0000491 – PM0000492
from Matthew R. Holman, Dir., Office of Sci., Ctr. for Tobacco Prods., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to
22nd Century Group, Inc. (2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/133635/download [hereinafter 22nd
Century PMTA Order]; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NO. PM0000491 – PM0000492, PREMARKET
TOBACCO APPLICATION (PMTA) TECHNICAL PROJECT LEAD (TPL) REVIEW (2015),
https://www.fda.gov/media/133633/download [hereinafter 22nd Century PMTA Decision Summary].
FDA’s documentation for the permissive MRTP orders it has issued are available at the FDA website.
Modified Risk Orders, supra note 23. See also Snus MRTP Order and IQOS MRTP Order, supra note
24. A single MRTP Decision Summary applies to all of the Swedish Match snus products receiving
MRTP orders or analysis relating to the AFPPH determination. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. NOS.
MR0000020-MR0000022, MR0000024-MR0000025, MR0000027-MR0000029, SCIENTIFIC REVIEW OF
MODIFIED RISK TOBACCO PRODUCT (MRTP) APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 911 (D) OF THE FD&C ACT
- TECHNICAL PROJECT LEAD (TPL) REVIEW 10–11, 45–46 (Oct. 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/131923/download [hereinafter Snus MRTP Decision Summary]. A single
Decision Summary also applies to all of the IQOS products receiving MRTP orders. U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., STNS MR000059–MR000061, MR0000133 SCIENTIFIC REVIEW OF MODIFIED RISK TOBACCO
PRODUCT APPLICATION (MRTPA) UNDER SECTION 911(D) OF THE FD&C ACT – TECHNICAL PROJECT
LEAD, (July 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/139796/download [hereinafter IQOS MRTP Decision
Summary].
46. For example, all of the PMTA decision summaries state: “The statute provides that the finding
as to whether the marketing of a product for which a PMTA is submitted would be appropriate for the
protection of the public health shall be determined with respect to the risks and benefits to the
population as a whole, including users and nonusers of the tobacco product, and taking into account ─
(A) the increased or decreased likelihood that existing users of tobacco products will stop using such
products; and (B) the increased or decreased likelihood that those who do not use tobacco products will
start using such products.” IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 11; Snus PMTA Decision
Summary, supra note 45, at 8. See also 22nd Century PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 45 (using
similar language to describe the standard). Compare Snus PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 45, at
8, and IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 11, and 22nd Century PMTA Decision
Summary, supra note 45, with TCA, sec. 101, § 910(c)(4) (codified at § 387j(c)(4)). Along the same
lines, FDA also states that “the broad overall objective of authorizing new tobacco products to be
marketed through the PMTA process is to reduce the morbidity and mortality from tobacco use.” Snus
PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 34. Much less detail regarding the AFPPH standard is
provided in the final orders, and no other text in the orders or summaries explicitly offers any further
clarification of the AFPPH standard. Similarly, the Decision Summary for the Swedish Match snus
MRTP Order simply refers to assessing “the potential benefits and harms to the health of the population
as a whole, taking into account both users of tobacco products and persons who do not currently use
tobacco products,” without any further clarification, other than listing the various ways the product’s
marketing might impact behaviors of users and nonusers with related impacts on the health of the
population as a whole. See, e.g., Snus MRTP Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 10. For similar text
relating to the IQOS MRTP, see, e.g., IQOS MRTP Decision Summary, supra note 44, at 8. For the
most part, these references simply restate the statutory text or slightly paraphrase it. Compare Snus
MRTP Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 10, and IQOS MRTP Decision Summary, supra note 44,
and Snus PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 34, and 22nd Century PMTA Decision
Summary, supra note 45, with TCA, sec. 101, § 911(g)(1, 4) (codified at § 387k(g)(1, 4)).
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accordingly, or FDA developed or adopted its own concept of how the AFPPH
standard should be interpreted and applied but has not disclosed that concept,
explained the reasoning behind it, or revealed how that concept has been applied
in these PMTA and MRTP determinations and orders.
At the same time, FDA’s publicly released documentation for most of its
permissive PMTA and MRTP orders clearly acknowledge the possibility that the
marketing of the new products could or would cause some new individual health
harms or could even create an overall negative net public health impact, and,
therefore, might end up not being AFPPH.47 For example, the Snus PMTA
Decision Summary stated that allowing the marketing of the snus “may” decrease
some individual users health risks without posing increased risk to the general
population “unless use patterns change in unfavorable ways,” and acknowledged
a “low likelihood” that the snus marketing would increase nonuser uptake and
decrease or delay cessation.48 Similarly, the Decision Summary for the snus
MRTP Order stated that although FDA’s review found that the products will
benefit the health of the population as a whole, that determination may change
over time as a function of how the product is actually used by consumers.49 The
IQOS PMTA Decision Summary concluded that current evidence indicated that
IQOS uptake among youth and nonsmokers would occur, but would be low, even
though “the potential for rapid uptake of a novel tobacco product among youth
exists.”50 Moreover, the IQOS PMTA and the snus MRTP orders included some
specific restrictions and requirements to prevent youth use and possibly other
harmful uses.51 But FDA clearly saw that the marketing of the products could
still cause more individual and public health harms than FDA anticipated or
expected. For example, the IQOS PMTA Order stated that compliance with its
requirements “is not a guarantee that the marketing of the products will remain
appropriate for the protection of the public health, particularly if, despite these
measures, there is a significant uptake in youth initiation,” and the snus MRTP
47. As this article was largely completed and processed prior to FDA’s release of the PMTA Order
for the 22nd Century Group reduced nicotine cigarettes and the IQOS MRTP Order, its analysis and
illustrative examples from FDA documentation focuses primarily on the IQOS PMTA Order and the
Swedish Match Snus MRTP Order, including the PMTA Order underlying the Swedish Match Snus
MRTP Order. With some exceptions, this article will reference those later orders only when their
documentation presents something relevant that is new or different from the others. Unfortunately, these
newer orders and their underlying documentation show that FDA has continued to review PMTA and
MRTP applications and issue related permissive orders with all of the same problems and flaws this
paper identifies in its analysis of the agency’s prior review of PMTA and MRTP applications and
subsequent permissive orders.
48. Snus PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 36–37.
49. Snus MRTP Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 13, 48.
50. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 76; see also id. at 79 (“[t]he applicant
provides very little justification and no specific empirical evidence to support the assumptions that
individuals who do not currently smoke cigarettes would not be interested in using the proposed
products or that young people would not find them appealing”).
51. IQOS PMTA Order, supra note 45 at 113–15; Snus MRTP Order, supra note 24 at 13–18.
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Order has similar text.52 Anticipating the possibility of unexpected negative
impacts, all the PMTA and MRTP orders also require a range of post-market
surveillance and reporting regarding new research, consumer behaviors, and
other matters to “help FDA determine whether continued marketing of [the]
product is appropriate for the protection of the public health or whether there are
or may be grounds for withdrawing or temporarily suspending [the permissive]
order.”53
Accordingly, FDA was implicitly using an interpretation of the AFPPH
standard that, in at least some situations, allows new tobacco products on the
market or allows new reduced risk claims even if they could create new
individual health harms or might produce a negative net impact on the overall
public health. However, FDA does not provide any explanation or justification
for interpreting and applying the AFPPH standard in that way. Nor does FDA
otherwise clarify its interpretation of the AFPPH standard or how it applies in
these specific situations. In particular, FDA has not explained in even general
terms what kinds of larger likelihoods and sizes of potential net public health
gain make it AFPPH to allow a new PMTA product on the market that will create
new health harms and a risk of an overall negative public health impact. Nor can
any such ratios or contrasts be implied or reverse engineered from the snus or
IQOS PMTA orders or decision summaries, because they do not identify all the
different ways the products could produce harm reductions and harm increases
and do not provide any estimates or comparisons of the risk of new harms versus
the likelihood of new harm reductions.54

52. IQOS PMTA Order, supra note 45, at 1; Snus MRTP Order, supra note 24, at 2. See also IQOS
PMTA Decision Summary supra note 29, at 111, 115, 116, 120 (containing similar content). The IQOS
PMTA Decision Summary also states that continuing research into the compounds found at higher levels
in IQOS than in conventional cigarettes and into the long-term health effects from complete and
incomplete switching to IQOS would help to ensure that the continued marketing of IQOS is AFPPH.
IQOS PMTA Decision Summary supra note 29, at 84.
53. Snus PMTA Order, supra note 45, at 3. See also IQOS PMTA Order, supra note 45, at 9; Snus
MRTP Order, supra note 24, at 14 (using similar language). See also IQOS PMTA Decision Summary,
supra note 29, at 111, 115, 116, 120 (raising parallel concerns of possible undesired impacts). In
addition, both the Snus PMTA Orders and the IQOS PMTA Order require annual reports that include a
summary of how the marketing of the tobacco products continues to be appropriate for the protection of
public health. Snus PMTA Order, supra note 45, at 4; IQOS PMTA Order, supra note 45, at 9.
54. When speaking about FDA determinations to allow a new tobacco product on the market, a
senior staff person from the FDA Center for Tobacco Products stated: “Although there is not a
regulatory definition, FDA considers a product ‘Appropriate for Protection of the Public Health’
(APPH) if we determine marketing of the product has the potential to result in decreasing morbidity
and/or mortality[,]” however, nothing was said as to whether that potential had to be larger than the
potential that it would increase morbidity and/or mortality. Priscilla Callahan-Lyon, Deputy Dir., Div. of
Individual Health Sci. FDA Ctr. for Tobacco Prod. et al., Presentation at FDLI Tobacco and Nicotine
Prod. Reg. and Pol’y Conf.: A Review of FDA’s ENDS Guidance and the IQOS Marketing Order, 18
(Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.fdli.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/945-1030-Premarket-Tobacco.pdf
(last visited July 15, 2020). Adding some confusion, the IQOS MRTP Decision Summary distinguishes
the standard’s application to MRTP orders allowing reduced-risk claims from those allowing reduced-
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Even if FDA reasonably developed the more detailed interpretation of the
TCA’s AFPPH standard that is necessary to make valid PMTA and MRTP
evaluations, there is nothing in the public record of its PMTA and MRTP
deliberations and orders for the snus and IQOS products that would allow the
courts or anyone else to determine what that interpretation might be or whether
those orders comply, or whether FDA’s interpretation and application of the
AFPPH in developing these PMTA orders is reasonable and fits within the
constraints of the statute and the Administrative Procedure Act. This lack of
transparency and the absence of any evidence that the PMTAs and the related
permissive orders were evaluated against any rational conception of the AFPPH
standard make FDA’s orders “arbitrary or capricious,” either because FDA failed
to engage in a rational, comprehensible decision-making process or did that only
behind the scenes and failed to reveal and explain it.55 It also means that any
court review of FDA’s final PMTA orders (if it did not reject them as “arbitrary
or capricious” for procedural failings) would have to apply its own concept of
the AFPPH standard with no expert or reasoned guidance from FDA as to how
the standard’s remaining gray areas should be interpreted or applied.

exposure claims by stating that for the former FDA must determine “that the product, as actually used by
consumers, will significantly reduce harm and risk to individual users; a finding that the product, as
actually used by consumers, will benefit the health of the population a as whole)” but the latter allows
FDA to issue an MRTP order “when risk reduction has not yet been demonstrated but is reasonably
likely based on demonstrated reductions in exposure (e.g., a finding that a reduction in morbidity or
mortality among individual users is reasonably likely in subsequent studies; a finding that issuance of an
order is expected to benefit the health of the population as a whole).” IQOS MRTP Decision Summary,
supra note 45. But such a strict standard requiring FDA to determine that any MRTP order it issues to
allow reduced-risk claims will produce a net public health gain would be impossible to meet given the
inevitable uncertainties regarding how the product will actually be marketed and how consumers,
including nonusers, will respond. See supra notes 48–49, and associated text. Indeed, if FDA were
actually interpreting the MRTP standard for reduced-risk claims so strictly, it could not have issued its
permissive MRTP order for the Swedish Match Snus, given the possibility that their snus marketing,
with or without the MRTP claim, might encourage harm increasing uses of the product more than harmreducing uses and, as acknowledged by FDA, turn out not to be AFPPH. See supra notes 48–49, 53, and
accompanying text. See also infra notes 143–148 and associated text. Accordingly, this statement by
FDA only confirms what was already known — that the standard that applies to allowing reducedexposure MRTP claims is less stringent than that applying to allowing reduced-risk claims — without
providing any new insights into how FDA might be interpreting the remaining gray areas of the
standard.
55. See supra notes 35, 37 and accompanying text; see also, Teva Pharmaceuticals U.S., Inc. v.
FDA, 441 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The FDA’s “stated rationale for its decision is erroneous” and
“we cannot sustain its action on some other basis [it] did not mention”“) (quoting PDK Labs. Inc. v.
U.S. DEA, 362 F.3d 786 (D.C. Cir (2003)); Williams Gas Processing-Gulf Coast Co., L.P. v. Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 475 F.3d 319, 328–29 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Arbitrary and capricious review
strictly prohibits us from upholding agency action based only on our best guess as to what reasoning
truly motivated it”); Cigar Ass’n of Am. v. FDA, 315 F. Supp. 3d 143, 184 (D.D.C. May 15, 2018)
(“Nor can the court ask the parties for further explanations . . . [or] accept ‘post hoc rationalizations for
agency actions,’” (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983)).
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IV. FDA HAS NOT DONE CERTAIN ANALYSES OR MADE CERTAIN FINDINGS
NECESSARY FOR EVALUATING WHETHER ITS PERMISSIVE PMTA ORDERS ARE
AFPPH (UNDER ANY POSSIBLE VIABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE STANDARD)
While FDA found that its PMTA and MRTP orders for the snus and IQOS
created a risk of producing new health harms and at least some risk of producing
a net harm to the public health, FDA’s documentation does not reveal any effort
to identify and quantify all the harms or risks the orders create to individuals or
to the public health nor does it evaluate all those new risks and harms against the
likelihood and size of the orders’ potential individual and public health gains.
Yet that kind of analysis is necessary to make a reasonable determination that
issuing a permissive PMTA or MRTP order is AFPPH under any legally viable
interpretation of the AFPPH standard that might be developed and applied. Even
if FDA were using a quite permissive interpretation of the standard that allows
an order to produce not only new health harms but also a risk of a negative net
public health impact so long as they were significantly smaller than the
likelihood and size of the expected net public health gain, FDA would still need
to make some kind of reasonable determination that the risk of a negative net
public health impact was, indeed, significantly smaller. But as detailed below,
FDA’s final orders and decision summaries do not show that FDA has done
that.56
In particular, FDA did not consider what the worst-case scenarios for the
public health might be from issuing its permissive PMTA and MRTP orders, nor
try to estimate how likely such worst-case scenarios might be. Nor did FDA
identify all the different ways that the permitted marketing might increase health
harms and risks or estimate the related health harms, or compare those possible
harms to the likelihood and size of the possible health gains from the harmreducing uses of the products. At most, FDA only indicated or implied that the
likely or expected health gains from issuing the order would be larger than the
likely or expected health harms (without explaining why that was sufficient for
an AFPPH determination). Overall, the final PMTA and MRTP orders and their
underlying documentation show that FDA evaluated the quality of the research

56. Even if FDA actually did that kind of analysis behind the scenes before making its AFPPH
determinations, doing so without describing them in the formal record of its PMTA decisions would be
“arbitrary or capricious” and its invisible efforts would not be part of the official public record and could
not be cited to support FDA’s final determinations if they were challenged in court. See supra note 55
and accompanying text. See also Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 879 F.3d
966, 973 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Our review ‘is limited to … the administrative record’ (citation omitted) and
to those ‘grounds upon which . . . the record discloses that [the agency’s] action was based’” (quoting
SEC v. Chenery Corp. 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943)); and “[w]e can only uphold agency action on grounds
articulated by the agency in its orders”); Williams Gas Processing v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
373 F.3d 1335, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“It is axiomatic that we may uphold agency orders based only on
reasoning that is fairly stated by the agency in the order under review”) citing SEC v. Chenery Corp. 318
U.S. 80, 88,87 (1943)).
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and other evidence and analysis provided by the applicants in an oddly passive,
vague, and incomplete way that cannot reasonably be characterized as supporting
any AFPPH determination.
While all of FDA’s permissive PMTA and MRTP orders to date reveal
these shortcomings, for brevity’s sake this analysis will focus on the PMTA order
for the IQOS inhalable “heat-not-burn” tobacco products and the MRTP order
for the Swedish Match snus (which builds on FDA’s prior PMTA Order for those
snus).57
A. The Missing Analyses and Questionable Assumptions in FDA’s Permissive
PMTA Orders for the Philip Morris IQOS Products
FDA’s PMTA Order allowing the marketing of the Philip Morris IQOS
products and the underlying Decision Summary show that FDA considered the
marketing of IQOS quite risky for the public health. Although FDA included
some marketing and sales restrictions in the Final Order to reduce those risks, its
analysis and findings were still riddled with major errors and omissions that
makes the agency’s PMTA review process “arbitrary or capricious” and
incapable of supporting its final AFPPH determination.
The documentation for FDA’s PMTA Order for the Philip Morris IQOS
products does not include any statement that provides an overall summary or
conclusion as to why FDA found issuing the orders AFPPH. Instead, FDA lists
a number of points that its scientific review of the applications has demonstrated
and then, without providing additional findings or analysis, states: “In
conclusion, . . .[p]ermitting the marketing of the products is appropriate for the
protection of the public health . . . (subject to the labeling and advertising
changes described above).”58
57. See IQOS PMTA Order, supra note 45; Snus MRTP Order, supra note 24. These two orders,
supplemented by the subsequently issued IQOS MRTP Order, are likely the most risky to the public
health that FDA has issued, as the IQOS products are considerably more harmful to users and more
likely to be used in harm-increasing ways by smokers and nonusers than the PMTA Swedish Match snus
and, unlike the PMTA 22nd Century Group very-low-nicotine cigarettes, are highly addictive, and the
Swedish Match and IQOS MRTP orders are is the only orders to date allowing the marketing of any
addictive and harmful tobacco product with reduced-risk or reduced-exposure claims, which could
prompt a range of harm-increasing (as well as harm-reducing) uses. Id.; IQOS MRTP Order, supra note
24.
58. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 12. The only clearly identified “changes
described above” were requiring a warning on all packaging of IQOS heatsticks stating that they contain
addictive nicotine and removal of a warning about cigarette smoke containing carbon monoxide on the
IQOS products (as required on conventional cigarettes) because the heatsticks, “although categorized as
cigarettes, do not produce carbon monoxide above environmental levels and do not increase CO-related
health risks.” Id. It is possible that the “changes described above” also meant to include the provisions in
the final orders that require age and ID verification prior to any electronic advertising or sales and
disclosures of Philip Morris’s sponsorship in any third-party marketing or promotions done on its behalf.
IQOS PMTA Order, supra note 45, at 14–15. However, they are “described above” only generally in an
Executive Summary bullet with no description or detail, the main text of the Decision Summary
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Yet the Executive Summary’s bullets listing the key findings from FDA’s
scientific review are, in many cases, quite tentative and imprecise and based on
scarce and inconclusive available research and data, with the main text of the
Decision Summary providing little additional fortification or explanation.
Indeed, the following discussion of some of the key bulleted text from the
Decision Summary (in italics) also shows that there is no way to connect the dots,
using those bullets, to establish any reasonable pathway to support FDA’s
AFPPH determination:
Although the studies conducted by the applicant do not demonstrate
reduction in long-term disease risks, the currently available evidence
indicates [conventional cigarette] smokers who switch completely to
IQOS will have reduced toxic exposures and this is likely to lead to
less risk of tobacco-related diseases.59
While the Decision Summary discusses related research and evidence, it
does not make this conclusion any more specific or detailed, but it does suggest
some weaknesses. For example, FDA states that the applicant provided an
inadequate assessment of four carcinogens and 20 other potentially harmful
chemicals that IQOS users are exposed to at higher levels than conventional
cigarette smokers or that are not even found in conventional cigarette smoke, and
failed to support a conclusion that the IQOS does not pose any risk to users.60
But FDA nevertheless concludes that the exposure levels appear low and, when
considered with other data, that “does not preclude a conclusion the products are
appropriate for protection of public health.”61 Then FDA notes, without any
provides no discussion or analysis of those restrictions and requirements, and its conclusion section also
describes the AFPPH determination as subject only to the changed warning label requirements. IQOS
PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 12, 86–90, 98–99. Moreover, the Decision Summary twice
states that allowing IQOS on the market would not be AFPPH without the required addiction warning
but makes no such statement about the electronic advertising and sales restrictions or the disclosure
requirement. Id. at 12, 98. Those restrictions are first described only at the end of the Decision
Summary, in its proposed language for the final orders, with no related analysis or justification. Id. at
108–09. However, the Decision Summary Appendix states that: “Placing certain marketing restrictions
on the newly authorized tobacco products from the outset, such as the media channels through which the
firm markets its products, are essential components of limiting youth-exposure, and are thus appropriate
for the protection of public health.” Id. at 116; see also id. at 115 (describing the purpose of marketing
requirements and restrictions for new tobacco products). In this way, the Appendix appears to be
focusing on showing that it was AFPPH to include the restrictions in the Final Order, rather than
explaining that FDA had determined that the orders could not be AFPPH unless they included those
restrictions). See id. at 115–16. This distinction could be relevant if the requirements were legally
challenged on First Amendment grounds. See discussion infra note 163 and accompanying text.
59. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 11.
60. Id. at 32.
61. Id. (providing a parallel analysis and “does not preclude” a conclusion regarding other
potentially harmful constituents produced by IQOS use). FDA’s “does not preclude” findings are a bit
odd, given that the TCA requires PMTA applicants to provide evidence that enables FDA to determine
that allowing the product on the market is AFPPH, and gives no indication that it is sufficient for the
FDA to simply state that such a determination is not precluded based on the application’s evidence and
other available evidence FDA finds and considers. TCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31, sec. 101, § 910(c)(2)(a),
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further evaluation or analysis, that eight other chemicals which IQOS users are
exposed to at higher levels than conventional cigarette smokers were also
identified as potentially genotoxic and/or carcinogenic.62 More broadly, FDA
states that “the studies conducted by the applicant have not demonstrated
evidence of reduction in long-term disease risks,” and “reduced risk has not been
demonstrated in the studies submitted by the applicant.”63 Yet FDA concludes
that such a reduction is likely because “the currently available evidence indicates
that [conventional cigarette] smokers who switch completely to IQOS will have
reduced toxic exposures and, consequently, although not demonstrated in the
studies in the application, are less likely to be at risk of tobacco-related
diseases.”64
123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387j(c)(2)(a)(2012)). Moreover, FDA provides no
explanation of how large those new health risks would have to be to preclude an AFPPH determination
or how FDA determined that the likelihood and size of those health risks were not sufficient to do so.
62. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 32–33.
63. Id. at 59, 56.
64. Id. at 65. This analysis of FDA’s PMTA orders will not question FDA’s expertise or discretion
in evaluating and analyzing the research and other information provided by the applicants or other
research FDA cites in its decision summaries. But it is worth noting that the IQOS PMTA Decision
Summary does not mention several published peer-reviewed studies that were readily available to FDA
and can be seen as taking a more negative view of IQOS harms and risks than the Decision Summary
presents. See, e.g., Farzad Moazed et al., Assessment of Industry Data on Pulmonary and
Immunosuppressive Effects of IQOS, 27 Supplement 1 TOBACCO CONTROL at S20–S25 (2018),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6252496; Gideon St. Helen et al., IQOS: Examination
of Philip Morris International’s Claim of Reduced Exposure, 27 Supplement 1 TOBACCO CONTROL at
s30–s36 (2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6252487; Stanton A. Glantz, PMI’s
Own in Vivo Clinical Data on Biomarkers of Potential Harm in Americans Show that IQOS is Not
Detectably Different from Conventional Cigarettes, 27 Supplement 1 TOBACCO CONTROL s9–s12
(2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6202159; Barbara Davis et al., iQOS: Evidence
of Pyrolysis and Release of a Toxicant From Plastic, 28 TOBACCO CONTROL 34 (2018),
https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/28/1/34. Critiques of the research submitted by Philip Morris in
support of its PMTA application, with references to contradictory research, were also provided to FDA
in comments submitted to the public docket for Philip Morris’s related application to secure a
permissive MRTP order, but none of those comments were mentioned or addressed in the IQOS PMTA
Decision Summary. See, e.g., Matthew Springer, Comment Letter on the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) Notice: Modified Risk Tobacco Product Applications: Applications for IQOS System With
Marlboro Heatsticks, IQOS System With Marlboro Smooth Menthol Heatsticks, and IQOS System With
Marlboro Fresh Menthol Heatsticks Submitted by Philip Morris Products S.A.; Availability (Nov. 20,
2017), www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2017-D-3001-0118 (stating that the Philip Morris
application “does not support the conclusion that IQOS will not harm endothelial function” and that
independent research “shows that IQOS harms endothelial function as much as conventional
cigarettes”). The IQOS PMTA Decision Summary does not mention this comment or the cited research,
and only mentions the word “endothelial” once in a passing reference. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary,
supra note 29, at 58. See generally Laura K. Lempert, & Stanton A. Glantz, Notes on FDA’s Technical
Project Lead Review for the IQOS PMTA 19 (June 17, 2019),
https://tobacco.ucsf.edu/sites/tobacco.ucsf.edu/files/wysiwyg/Notes%20on%20FDAs%20Technical%20
Project%20Lead%20Review%20for%20the%20IQOS%20PMTA_17Jun2019.docx, and Laura K.
Lempert, & Stanton A. Glantz, Analysis of FDA’s IQOS Marketing Authorisation & its Policy Impacts,
TOBACCO CONTROL (June 29, 2020),
https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/early/2020/06/29/tobaccocontrol-2019-055585.info (providing
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FDA does not, however, provide any indication as to how likely or large
these reductions of disease risk might actually be or what the worst case scenario
might be in regard to IQOS health impacts on either smokers who switch (or to
brand-new users or dual users).65 Moreover, FDA does state that additional
research into IQOS health risks and harms is needed or would be helpful “to
support the continued marketing of the products as appropriate for the protection
of the public health,” thereby acknowledging that future research into IQOS
health harms could show that allowing the marketing of IQOS is not AFPPH.66
But FDA does not explain why running that risk by allowing IQOS on the market
now is AFPPH.
The data for [conventional cigarette] smokers who use IQOS while
continuing to smoke (dual use) is less clear but the available evidence
shows no increase in HPHC [harmful or potentially harmful
constituent] exposures for those who dual use.67
This conclusion is odd given FDA’s discussion later in the Decision
Summary about how inhaling IQOS’s aerosol exposes users to four carcinogens
and a number of other potentially harmful constituents not found in cigarette
smoke, which means dual users would be exposed to a greater number of HPHCs
than exclusive cigarette smokers.68 Moreover, FDA discusses research showing
that dual users on average reduced their cigarette consumption only slightly (by
about 1 cigarette per day) but replaced that with larger amounts of IQOS use
(about 2-4 heatsticks per day), and acknowledges that “the health benefits of

critiques of FDA’s evaluation of the science and other evidence in the IQOS PMTA Decision Summary
and identifying relevant research FDA did not appear to consider). However, the IQOS PMTA Decision
Summary does make several references to FDA staff having conducted an “independent review of the
literature” relating to certain specific matters, without listing the reviewed research, which might have
included consideration of some of the uncited research contrary to the research and assertions in the
Philip Morris application or to FDA’s related findings or conclusions. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary,
supra note 29, at 56, 58, 60, 93.
65. Throughout the Decision Summary, FDA describes and relies on research done or provided by
the applicant, Phillip Morris, without any reference to inherent conflicts of interest, past evaluations of
research finding biases in favor of industry positions in industry research and industry-supported
research, or past court determinations that Philip Morris and other tobacco companies have intentionally
misrepresented or distorted research. See e.g., Clayton Velicer et al., Tobacco Papers and Tobacco
Industry Ties in Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology, 39 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 34 (2018); Tom
Lasseter et al., Scientists Describe Problems in Philip Morris E-Cigarette Experiments, REUTERS (Dec.
20, 2017,), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/tobacco-iqos-science; Elisa K. Tong &
Stanton A. Glantz, Tobacco Industry Efforts Undermining Evidence Linking Secondhand Smoke with
Cardiovascular Disease, 116 CIRCULATION 1845 (2007); United States v. Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp.
2d 1, 208, 870–71, 877–78, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Yogi H. Hendlin et al., Financial Conflicts of Interest
and Stance on Tobacco Harm Reduction: A Systematic Review, 109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (2019). See
also infra note 120.
66. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 84.
67. Id. at 11.
68. Id. at 32.
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reducing cigarette consumption instead of quitting completely are unclear.”69
FDA stated later that: “Whether this [dual] user population will achieve an
exposure reduction when compared to exclusive [conventional cigarette] use,
and to what magnitude, is unclear.”70 Nevertheless, FDA ultimately concluded
that “based on the currently available evidence, dual use is unlikely to pose
increased health risks compared to continued exclusive [conventional cigarette]
use.”71
While this conclusion seems odd based on just the research FDA mentions,
FDA did not even consider the possibility that the IQOS aerosol, like e-cigarette
aerosols, delivers its HPHCs through different types of particles with different
particle disposition in the mouth and respiratory tract compared to smoking,
which could have different health consequences that create brand new risks to
dual users (or complete switchers) that a simple comparison of exposure levels
would not reveal.72
At the same time, FDA clearly recognized that future data and research
might show that certain types of dual use are sufficiently prevalent and more
harmful than exclusive cigarette smoking, and that allowing the continued
marketing of IQOS would not be AFPPH.73 Yet FDA did not explain why
running that risk by issuing the current permissive PMTA Order is AFPPH, nor
did FDA estimate either the likelihood or size of any reasonable worst-case
69. Id. at 73, 96. It is also quite clear from existing research that reducing cigarette consumption is
a much less effective way to reduce harms and risks compared to quitting all smoking, which does not
secure any significant harm reductions at all unless the consumption declines are dramatic and reduce
smoking to very low levels. See, e.g., Rachna Begh, Does Reduced Smoking if You Can’t Stop Make Any
Difference? 13 BMC MED. 257 (Oct. 12, 2015),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4601132/; Peter N. Lee, The Effect of Reducing the
Number of Cigarettes Smoked on Risk of Lung Cancer, COPD, Cardiovascular Disease and FEV1–A
Review, 67(3) REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 372 (Dec. 2013),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0273230013001402?via%3Dihub; Allan Hackshaw
et al., Low Cigarette Consumption and Risk of Coronary Heart Disease and Stroke: Meta-Analysis of
141 Cohort Studies in 55 Study Reports, 360 BRIT. MED. J. (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5781309. See also, B. Poland, B & F. Teischinger,
Population Modeling of Modified Risk Tobacco Products Accounting for Smoking Reduction and
Gradual Transitions of Relative Risk, 19 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 1277 (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Population+Modeling+of+Modified+Risk+Tobacco+Prod
ucts+Accounting+for+Smoking+Reduction+and+Gradual+Transitions.
70. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 56.
71. Id. at 96.
72. See, e.g., National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Public Health
Consequences of E-cigarettes, NAT’L ACADS. PRESS 72 (Kathleen Stratton et al. eds., 2018),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29894118; See also Zachary T. Bitzer et al., Effects of Solvent
and Temperature on Free Radical Formation in Electronic Cigarette Aerosols, 31 CHEMICAL RES.
TOXICOLOGY 4 (2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29161504; Ariane Lechasseur et al.,
Variations in Coil Temperature/Power and E‐Liquid Constituents Change Size and Lung Deposition of
Particles Emitted by an Electronic Cigarette, 7 PHYSIOLOGICAL REPS. ( 2019),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6540444/.
73. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 83–84.
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scenario for possible increased user harms or public health harms from dual use,
which could either provide the basis for such an explanation or make it harder to
develop:
Dual use of IQOS and [conventional cigarettes] was common in all
countries in the pre- and post-market studies. . . 74
Rather than support FDA’s AFPPH determination, this bullet is purely
observational (based on relatively few studies) and could be seen as negative,
unless the dual users in other countries are not delaying smoking cessation but
clearly moving toward a complete switch. More importantly, FDA made no
related estimates or findings in the Decision Summary regarding how much dual
use might occur in the United States when IQOS is marketed pursuant to the
PMTA Order or about the possible characteristics of that dual use – such as the
extent to which it might or might not entail meaningful reductions in cigarette
consumption, be a precursor to smoking cessation, or prevent or delay either
smoking or total cessation. FDA was clearly aware of the risk that dual use could
prevent or reduce cessation.75 But FDA did not explicitly discuss that risk
anywhere in the Decision Summary, much less present any related findings or
estimates or explain how that risk did not interfere with its AFPPH
determination. Instead, the Decision Summary summarizes some studies relating
to dual use and concludes only that “the findings suggest that some smokers will
find IQOS appealing and acceptable enough to initiate use of the product;”76 dual
use “may account for a substantial portion of IQOS users in a real-world setting”
and “appears likely;”77 that “[t]he limited data available indicates that a dual-use
period is common during the switching period;”78 and “[t]here is evidence that
U.S. cigarette smokers are interested in IQOS, but limited data for use of IQOS
to achieve [conventional cigarette] smoking cessation.”79 Despite these
imprecise and incomplete findings, the Decision Summary concludes that “IQOS
is appropriate for protection of public health, even if there is some dual-use
among smokers as they potentially transition to the product.”80
The nicotine levels do pose an addiction risk for non-tobacco users
who initiate use of these products; however, the risk is no higher than

74. Id. at 11.
75. In a section of the Decision Summary focusing on the likelihood of IQOS use by current
smokers, FDA briefly described a study designed “to evaluate whether marketing IQOS would have
negative effects on smokers who intend to quit, such as causing them to delay their quit attempts.” Id. at
71 (including other passing references to dual use delaying or preventing cessation).
76. Id. at 71.
77. Id. at 56, 73.
78. Id. at 83. See also id. at 77, 97.
79. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 83.
80. Id. at 84.
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for other, currently available, tobacco products and initiation is
expected to be low generally.81
Even if such an expectation could provide a reasonable basis for an AFPPH
determination without further findings regarding the likelihood and size of
potential non-user initiation and addiction, the support for this low expectation
by FDA is unclear. FDA directly admits that because IQOS is still a relatively
new product in other countries, with limited data available only from Japan and
Italy, “the extent to which youth will initiate and use IQOS in these markets, or
any other market that may start selling IQOS, is unknown.”82 In addition,
referencing the sudden rapid growth in youth e-cigarette use in the USA after
they had already been on the market for several years, FDA states: “Certainly,
the potential for rapid uptake of a novel tobacco product among youth exists.”83
Nevertheless, FDA concludes that: “Overall, the current evidence indicates
IQOS uptake by youth and nonsmokers will be low.”84
This conclusion appears to be based on the fact that IQOS will be available
in the USA only in tobacco and menthol flavors (far fewer than the many flavors
available for e-cigarettes) and on FDA’s finding that these limited flavor options
and the price of IQOS “may reduce IQOS’s appeal to youth.”85 However, FDA
did not provide any data or analysis regarding the relative prices of IQOS versus
e-cigarettes or cigarettes, nor did FDA discuss the unique role menthol flavoring
has played in increasing youth smoking and e-cigarette initiation, which could
extend to IQOS initiation, as well.86 Unlike its analysis for the PMTA Order for
the Swedish Match snus, FDA did not consider the possibility that issuing a
permissive order for IQOS could also create a “perceived favorable profile” that
would increase nonuser initiation and use – and also discourage total cessation
and, through dual use, discourage smoking cessation.87
81. Id. at 11.
82. Id. at 76, 97.
83. Id. at 76.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id. On the role of menthol in youth initiation, see, e.g., James Nonemaker et al., Examining
the Role of Menthol Cigarettes in Progression to Established Smoking Among Youth, 98 ADDICTIVE
BEHAVIORS 106045, 1–2 (2019); Joanne D’Silva et al., Differences in Subjective Experiences to First
Use of Menthol and Nonmenthol Cigarettes in a National Sample of Young Adult Cigarette Smokers, 20
NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 1062, 1062–63 (2018); Suchitra Krishnan-Sarin et al., Studying the
Interactive Effects of Menthol and Nicotine Among Youth: An Examination Using E-Cigarettes, 180
DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 193, 193–94 (2017); FDA, Menthol and Other Flavors in Tobacco
Products, www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/products-ingredients-components/menthol-and-other-flavorstobacco-products (last visited July 15, 2020).
87. Snus PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 45. Although the Snus PMTA Decision Summary
does not clearly explain or define “perceived favorable profile,” it refers to the snus becoming more
popular with some potential consumers because of the snus receiving a permissive FDA PMTA Order –
possibly through press coverage and word of mouth via social media, (despite the TCA provision that
prohibits any express or implied statement or representation by manufacturers or sellers directed at
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FDA does state that: “The proposed marketing and advertising restrictions
will help ensure lower youth exposure and access to the products.”88 But it is not
clear whether FDA’s expectation of low youth initiation was contingent on the
Final Order including those restrictions – which require nicotine addiction
warnings, age and ID verification before electronic sales or advertising, and
disclosing Philip Morris’s sponsorship of any IQOS promotions done by thirdparties on its behalf.89 It is clear, however, that FDA believed that the marketing
of IQOS might produce a new surge in youth initiation, even with those
restrictions in place. Otherwise, the PMTA Order would not have required such
extensive post-market reporting and surveillance to “help FDA ensure, on an
ongoing basis, that the continued marketing of new tobacco products remains
appropriate for the protection of public health.”90 But the IQOS PMTA
documents do not explain why FDA determined that issuing the PMTA Order
was still AFPPH despite FDA’s contradicting conclusion that at least some new
youth initiation would occur and considerably higher levels of youth initiation
would be possible.91
In addition, the PMTA documents offer no analysis or findings about the
extent to which youth IQOS initiation would prompt IQOS initiation among
youth who would otherwise not initiate into any tobacco product use at all (as
opposed to preventing or delaying smoking initiation among otherwise smoking
youth) or about whether some youth who initially initiate into using IQOS would
subsequently initiate into more-harmful conventional cigarette smoking. Nor
does FDA specifically evaluate or estimate how harmful regular, long-term
IQOS use might be to nonsmoking youth or adults who would not otherwise have
initiated into any tobacco-nicotine use at all, even if they did not progress into
conventional smoking. Although FDA concludes that using IQOS alone is likely
less harmful than smoking, FDA makes no attempt to estimate the new individual
or public health harms that would be caused by the marketing of IQOS prompting
use by otherwise nonusers.
consumers that misleads them into believing the snus have been approved, deemed safe, or endorsed by
FDA or that the snus are safe or less harmful by virtue of the PMTA order or any other regulation or
inspection by FDA). TCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31, sec. 103, §301(b)(7)(13), 123 Stat. 1776 (2009)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 331(tt) (2012)).
88. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 12.
89. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
90. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 120; see also id. at 115; IQOS PMTA
Order, supra note 45, at 1, 6–7.
91. FDA’s social science review expressed concerns about the lack of information in the Philip
Morris applications “about youth under age 18, as well as the lack of a discussion of submitted data’s
applicability to youth and the lack of presentation of the data in stratified categories that would allow us
to make inferences about youth,” concluding that the applications “do not contain sufficient information
to address these concerns from a Social Science perspective.” IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra
note 29, at 83. However, the Technical Project Lead did not agree with the social science conclusions
and, referring only to the data from Italy and Japan where IQOS is already legally marketed, stated that:
“Overall, the current evidence indicates low IQOS uptake by youth.” Id.
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Data from Italy and Japan, where IQOS is already marketed: “show
low uptake by youth and current nonsmokers. In these countries, the
likelihood of uptake is slightly higher in former smokers, but still low.
Appropriately, the population most likely to use IQOS are current
[conventional cigarette] smokers.”92
This text provides only observations about data in two other countries, and
FDA does not link those observations to any related findings or conclusions as
to how the marketing of IQOS could affect uptake by youth, current nonsmokers,
former smokers, or current smokers in the United States. In addition, the
Decision Summary includes no discussion or findings regarding how the
marketing of IQOS in the United States might create new health harms by
prompting former smokers who would not otherwise relapse into smoking or any
other tobacco use to relapse into IQOS use, and possibly subsequently relapse
into smoking, as well.93
FDA’s Decision Summary acknowledges that IQOS use might be more
harmful than e-cigarette use.94 But it does not anywhere consider the possibility
that the marketing of IQOS might increase individual and public health harms by
prompting some users of e-cigarettes or other non-smoked tobacco products to
begin using IQOS, either through complete switching or dual use, or by
prompting smokers who would have otherwise switched to e-cigarettes to switch
to IQOS, instead.95 More broadly, FDA’s PMTA analysis did not consider
whether there was any reason to allow the marketing of IQOS as a potentially
harm-reducing smoking substitute given that a diverse range of less-harmful ecigarettes are already readily available in the U.S.96 In particular, the Decision

92. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29 at 12.
93. The closest the Decision Summary comes to doing any such evaluation is in its description and
critique of a study looking at former smokers’ and others’ stated likelihood to try IQOS after viewing
certain labeling and marketing materials, and in its description of data about former smokers’ and
others’ use of IQOS in Italy and Japan. Id. at 68–69, 73–76. But nothing is said about whether the
intended or actual IQOS use by former smokers might be instead of continued total cessation, instead of
other non-smoked tobacco product use, or instead of relapsing back into smoking, or might be a new
pathway to smoking relapse. Going the other way, the Decision Summary also does not consider
whether any former smokers who would otherwise relapse into smoking might relapse into using IQOS
instead.
94. Id. at 22 (describing and citing a study finding that the levels of certain harmful or potentially
harmful constituents were “1-2 orders of magnitude higher in [IQOS] compared to e-cigarettes”); see
also id. at 56 (stating that it would have been useful to have comparisons of the secondhand exposure
impacts from IQOS and other tobacco products, such as e-cigarettes).
95. Yet the Decision Summary notes that “[n]umerous studies demonstrate that consumers tend to
perceive IQOS as similar to e-cigarettes in terms of risk.” Id. at 89. It also describes a study finding that
respondent former smokers’ and never-smokers’ interest in IQOS appeared to be similar or somewhat
lower than their interest in e-cigarettes (with nothing said about current smokers’ relative interests) Id. at
75, 96.
96. On e-cigarettes being less harmful than IQOS, see supra note 94 and, e.g., Noel J. Leigh, et al.,
Cytotoxic Effects of Heated Tobacco Products (HTP) on Human Bronchial Epithelial Cells, 27
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Summary did not even discuss the issue of whether the marketing of IQOS would
prompt any smokers to switch entirely to IQOS who would not otherwise switch
completely to e-cigarettes (which is likely the only way IQOS marketing could
produce any new health gains).97
In addition, FDA did not consider specific ways that Philip Morris or IQOSselling retailers might, to maximize profits, legally advertise and promote IQOS
to increase both harm-reducing and harm-increasing uses of the product within
the constraints of the PMTA Order.98 This omission seems odd given the long
history of both legal and illegal irresponsible marketing by the Philip Morris
entities, including reports of irresponsible Philip Morris marketing of IQOS

TOBACCO CONTROL s26 (2018) (providing a study that was not mentioned in the IQOS PMTA Decision
Summary).
97. FDA also failed to consider these issues in its evaluation of the Philip Morris application to
market IQOS with reduced-risk or reduced-exposure claims and FDA’s subsequent MRTP order
allowing its marketing with reduced-exposure claims. IQOS MRTP Decision Summary, supra note 45;
IQOS MRTP Order, supra note 24. The closest FDA comes to looking at any of these issues is in the
IQOS MRTP Decision Summary, where it references several applicant-submitted studies that
considered, among other things, the impact of IQOS labeling and marketing materials on consumers’
intent to use various products, including IQOS, combusted cigarettes, e-cigarettes, and any other
nicotine-containing products. IQOS MRTP Decision Summary, supra note 45 at 46. Yet there is no
related discussion relating to e-cigarettes, such as whether any e-cigarette users might switch to IQOS.
The Decision Summary elsewhere notes that another study indicated that consumers generally consider
IQOS health risks as slightly higher than e-cigarette use, and later mentions that consumers might be
more likely to try IQOS if e-cigarettes were not available. Id. at 46, 59. But there is no related discussion
of whether IQOS would still serve as a constructive smoking alternative given the ready availability of
e-cigarettes that are both less harmful than IQOS and generally perceived as less harmful.
98. The IQOS PMTA Decision Summary “Marketing Plan” subsection states that, at the request of
FDA, the applicant provided a summary of its plan for marketing IQOS in the U.S. IQOS MRTP
Decision Summary, supra note 45 at 86–87. But the text describing its main concepts is redacted, and
FDA provides no related analysis or comments. Id. In the Decision Summary Appendix, FDA discusses
research and other findings on how tobacco product advertising and promotions can increase youth,
nonuser, and overall use. Id. at 111–22. The Appendix does not make any connection between its
analysis (done to support the order’s electronic advertising and sales restrictions and advertising
reporting requirements) and the Decision Summary’s findings of likely low harms and risks from
allowing the marketing of IQOS. See also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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before FDA issued its IQOS PMTA Order.99 None of that is even mentioned in
the Decision Summary.100
It is difficult to understand or justify FDA’s failure to consider possible
health-harming industry practices relating to IQOS or many of the obvious ways
youth and adult nonusers and users of different types of tobacco products might
respond to IQOS marketing in harmful ways. Section 910 of the Tobacco Control
Act requires FDA to consider all of the possible tobacco product user and
nonuser responses to the marketing of IQOS and their potential impacts on the
risks and benefits to the health of the population as a whole when making its
PMTA AFPPH determinations.101 In addition, existing case law firmly
establishes that FDA’s PMTA AFPPH determinations, if challenged in court,
will be struck down as “arbitrary or capricious” if FDA has not at least
considered significant evidence and analysis that was presented to or otherwise
known to FDA that could have changed its findings or determinations.102
Even if these material omissions were somehow excused, the actual
findings FDA did make to support its AFPPH determination are too imprecise
and uncertain to provide a legally defensible foundation. As outlined above, FDA
bases its determination on findings that: (1) smokers who switch completely to

99. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 at 511-29, 560-61, 58094, 616-22, 639-43, 645-51, 656-64, 667-72, 682-84, 691-92, 852-53, 907-13 (D. D.C. 2006) [aff’d in
United States v. Philip Morris, 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009)]; Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, The
Facts about Philip Morris International: Company Is Cause of the Tobacco Problem, Not the Solution,
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/images/content/PMI_bad_acts.pdf (last visited July 15, 2020);
Letter from Matthew L. Myers, President, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, to Mitchell Zeller,
Director, FDA Center for Tobacco Products, (Mar. 23, 2018),
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/content/press_office/2018/2018_03_28_IQOS_global_marketin
g.pdf (last visited July 15, 2020); Letter from Matthew L. Myers, President, Campaign for Tobacco-Free
Kids, to Mitchell Zeller, Director, FDA Center for Tobacco Products, (Aug. 13, 2018),
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/content/what_we_do/federal_issues/fda/2018_08_13_IQOS_FD
A_Social_Media_Marketing.pdf (last visited July 15, 2020); Sheila Kaplan, Big Tobacco’s Global
Reach on Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/24/health/tobacco-social-media-smoking.html (last visited July 15,
2020).
100. Before FDA issued its IQOS PMTA Decision Summary and Order, there were also reports
about the electronics in IQOS enabling Philip Morris to collect information about how often and how
heavily IQOS consumers use the product, which Philip Morris could use to identify users reducing or
quitting consumption to target with special advertising or promotions. See, e.g., Tom Lasseter et al.,
Philip Morris device knows a lot about your smoking habit, REUTERS, (May 15, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/tobacco-iqos-device. This issue also was not
mentioned in the IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, although it is possible that the redacted text in the
descriptions of the IQOS products might have mentioned this information collection capacity. See IQOS
PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 14–16.
101. TCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31 sec. 101 § 910(c)(4), 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §
387j(c)(4) (2012)). See also Lindblom, supra note 22, at 541–42.
102. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007)
(holding that an agency would be arbitrary or capricious if it “entirely failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem”); see also supra note 37.
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using only IQOS are likely to reduce their risk of tobacco-related disease; (2)
some smokers might switch completely to IQOS; (3) more smokers will engage
in dual use, but that probably will not increase their health harms compared to
just smoking; (4) youth and other nonuser initiation is expected to be low
generally; and (5) IQOS use by former smokers, although somewhat more likely
than nonuser initiation, will also likely be low.103
Even if we overlook the questionable aspects of some of these findings and
assume they are all accurate or reasonably determined, these five findings cannot
be added together to support a reasonable conclusion that allowing the marketing
of IQOS is more likely to produce a net public health gain rather than a net public
health loss. To make such a conclusion (arguably the very minimum that might
possibly be sufficient to justify an AFPPH determination), FDA would need to
go further and also find, at least, that the likelihood and size of all the possible
health benefits from IQOS serving as a complete smoking substitute would be
larger than the likelihood and size of the possible new health harms from all the
different harm-increasing uses of IQOS.104 But FDA did not make any such
statement or finding and did not otherwise weigh the likelihood or size of all the
different possible new harms from allowing IQOS on the market against the
likelihood or size of the different possible harm reductions.105
Reading between the lines in the light most favorable to FDA, one might
speculate from the publicly available IQOS PMTA decision documents that
FDA, based on its review of the Philip Morris application, found that if IQOS
were allowed on the market: (1) some smokers who would not otherwise quit
smoking or all use would switch entirely to using IQOS and thereby reduce their
tobacco-related harms; (2) other smokers engaging in dual use would not
increase their harms (and would not have otherwise quit smoking or all use); and

103. See IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 11–12. The Decision Summary also
briefly mentions that complete switching by smokers to using IQOS could also benefit those who would
be exposed to secondhand IQOS aerosol instead of secondhand smoke by reducing their HPHC
exposure. Id. at 92.
104. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
105. Philip Morris’s application provided a Population Health Impact Model designed to project the
possible positive and negative effects on the population health of the United States from allowing IQOS
to be marketed, based on different assumptions about harmfulness and consumer responses. Id. at 77–79,
97–98. After stating that it had no concerns with the model’s statistical and computational aspects, FDA
pointed out some limitations of the model (e.g., considered only cigarettes and IQOS and not the use of
other tobacco products and provided only 20-year projections) and rejected some of Philip Morris’s
assumptions (e.g., that nonsmokers would not use IQOS). Id. Rather than require that Philip Morris fix
the model’s shortcomings and provide projections for a range of different assumptions – so that FDA
would be able to evaluate and compare reasonable worst-case, middle-case, and best-case scenarios in
terms of possible public health gains versus losses – FDA simply concluded that “the overall analysis of
the population model does not provide evidence to support the application.” Id.; see also Wendy B. Max
et al., Modelling the Impact of a New Tobacco Product: Review of Philip Morris International’s
Population Health Impact Model as Applied to the IQOS Heated Tobacco Product, 27 TOBACCO
CONTROL s82 (2018).
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(3) all the other harm-increasing uses of IQOS by smokers, dual users, former
smokers, e-cigarette users, and youth and adult nonusers would likely produce
new health harms that were smaller than the likely gains from the complete
switching by smokers who would not otherwise quit. But even if that was what
FDA actually did behind the scenes, it would still fail to pass legal muster
because FDA never stated in the IQOS PMTA Decision Summary or Order that
it made all those findings; did not present evidence and analysis that could
support all those findings; and did not show that it had considered certain
contrary facts, research, and analysis. In addition, FDA did not explain how such
a finding that the likely overall new harms from allowing IQOS on the market
would likely be smaller than the likely new harm-reductions could, by itself,
support an AFPPH determination.106
Accordingly, both the substance of FDA’s AFPPH determination and the
process FDA used to do its AFPPH evaluation and make its final determination
were “arbitrary or capricious.”107
B. The Missing Analyses and Questionable Assumptions in FDA’s Permissive
MRTP Order for the Swedish Match Snus
FDA determined that allowing the snus to be marketed with the proposed
reduced-risk claim will benefit the health of the population as a whole (despite
the possibility that it might produce net public health harms) based on FDA’s
finding that available evidence indicated that: (1) exclusive use of the snus,
although still harmful and addicting, was significantly less harmful than
exclusive smoking; (2) at least some smokers might switch exclusively to using
snus instead of smoking, with users of other, possibly more harmful smokeless
tobacco products even more likely to switch; and (3) the health gains from such
switching would likely be larger than any new health harms from nonusers also
starting to use the snus, as well.108
FDA’s analysis to support its snus MRTP Order was considerably stronger
than the analysis underlying its IQOS PMTA Order, both because of the more
extensive and conclusive available evidence regarding snus use being
significantly less harmful than smoking and because FDA directly addressed
more of the harm-increasing ways the snus might be used. But there were still a
number of troubling errors, omissions, and other shortcomings.
For example, in its discussion of the relative harmfulness of snus, FDA
reasonably concluded that dual use of snus with smoking is considerably more
harmful than using only snus and noted that it had previously concluded that

106. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
108. See Snus MRTP Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 6–7 (providing an executive summary of
FDA’s determinations).
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“there is insufficient information to conclude that smokers who use snus in
conjunction with smoking will realize any reductions in risk of tobacco‐related
disease.”109 But FDA did not discuss anywhere in the Decision Summary the
possibility of dual use by those who previously only smoked, especially without
sharp reductions to their prior smoking levels, might increase overall user harms
and risks. Nor did FDA mention that smokers who switch completely to snus
would not eliminate their smoking harms, given that their past smoking would
have already locked in certain current and future smoking-caused harms and
risks. FDA also did not discuss the possibility that snus-only use after years of
prior smoking might be considerably more harmful than snus use with no former
smoking.110 Nor did FDA mention that users of more-harmful smokeless tobacco
products who switched to snus would not, for parallel reasons, secure harm
reductions equal to the difference between the harmfulness of the snus and the
harmfulness of those other smokeless products.
In its analysis of how the marketing of the MRTP snus might affect different
harm-increasing or harm-reducing uses of the snus, FDA appropriately
considered impacts on smokers, former smokers, and adult and youth
nonusers.111 But FDA did not consider how the snus marketing might affect the
use of IQOS or e-cigarettes by different types of consumers (and did not make
any findings about the relative harmfulness of snus, IQOS, and e-cigarettes). The
Decision Summary also discussed the possibility that exposure to the reducedrisk claim could increase the risk that youth and young adult nonusers would
initiate into using the snus and experience new harms and risks (and the Final
Order included some related advertising restrictions).112 But FDA’s analysis did
not consider any specific ways that the manufacturer or retail sellers of the snus
might supplement the newly permitted reduced-risk claim with other claims or
marketing strategies (within the constraints of existing law and the MRTP Order
or without) to increase nonuser use or other harm-increasing uses.113 Nor did
109. Id. at 28–29. FDA also states that smokers who switch to dual use “would not experience a
reduction in their individual risk.” Id. at 29.
110. These facts were especially relevant given FDA’s reliance on the applicant’s study showing that
the proposed reduced-risk claim produced a significant increase in stated intentions to purchase the snus
only among older smokers (i.e., those likely to have larger accumulated smoking-caused health harms and
risks who would likely secure smaller harm reductions from switching completely compared to younger
smokers). The applicant’s study provided findings only for smokers 25 years of age or older (small
significant increase in stated intent to buy the snus) compared to those 18-24 years of age (no significant
increase), and FDA does not appear to have received or required data on whether such stated intentions
increased with age among those 25 years or older. Id. at 40, 41.
111. Id. at 39–43.
112. See id. at 42–43; Snus MRTP Order, supra note 24, at 13–15.
113. Fortunately, neither Swedish Match nor any major retailers appear to have yet marketed the
snus products in the United States in any clearly irresponsible or harm-increasing ways. But failing to
consider that possibility in making its evaluation of the possible harms and risks from allowing the snus
marketing with a reduced-risk claim remains imprudent and, therefore, “arbitrary and capricious,”
especially as, over time, competitive pressures can drastically change a profit-maximizing
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FDA mention the possibility, as it had with its underlying PMTA Order for the
snus, that the MRTP Order and related press or social media attention might
produce an additional “perceived favorable profile” that could further increase
nonuser initiation and use,114 or that the snus might become a new youth fad,
much like e-cigarettes have. Nor did FDA discuss the possibility that otherwise
nonusers who initiated into snus use might move on to smoking or other forms
of tobacco use more harmful than using the snus.115
As in its evaluation of the IQOS PMTA, FDA’s evaluation of the snus
MRTP application also did not provide any estimates of the likelihood or size of
the impacts the MRTP marketing might have on the different possible harmincreasing or harm-reducing uses of the snus, or of what the related health
consequences might be from each of those different use changes. Nor did FDA
provide any estimates of the worst-case, best-case, or expected net public health
gains from issuing the order, or explain how the expected net public health gains
justified running the risk of a negative net public health impact (which FDA
clearly considered possible).116 The absence of any such estimates makes it
difficult to understand how FDA could determine that issuing the order “will
significantly reduce harm and the risk of tobacco-related disease to individual
tobacco users and benefit the health of the population as a whole taking into
account both users of tobacco products and persons who do not currently use
tobacco products.”117 Moreover, FDA’s core finding to justify issuing the order
appears to be that “the population health benefits gained by cigarette smokers
(and potentially other smokeless tobacco users) switching to these products will
not be outweighed by the risks of initiating new tobacco use.” 118 That equation
not only has no estimated quantification but also omits any consideration of other
possible health harms from the snus marketing, such as new harms from smokers
switching to dual use instead of quitting smoking or switching to exclusive snus
use instead of quitting all tobacco-nicotine use.
manufacturer’s marketing behavior. For example, in meetings with FDA Center for Tobacco Product
staff in 2011–2012 some manufacturers of e-cigarettes said that they would never sell e-cigarettes with
any flavors other than tobacco or menthol (the only flavors permitted for cigarettes). Yet they soon
began marketing e-cigarettes with other flavors to try to regain market share from flavor-selling
competitors. This information coming from the recollection of the author from his time as Director of
the FDA Center for Tobacco Products Office of Policy.
114. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. Any such “perceived favorable profile” might also
increase other harm-increasing uses, as well as constructive switching to snus; but FDA did not discuss
that either.
115. Such use patterns could greatly increase the new harms from issuing the MRTP Order; and
FDA’s Decision Summary for the underlying PMTA Order it issued for these same snus stated that
switching from smokeless tobacco use to smoking is more common in the United States than switching
from smoking to smokeless tobacco use. See Snus PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 29–30.
116. See Snus MRTP Order, supra note 24, at 1–2; See Snus MRTP Decision Summary, supra note
45, at 13.
117. Snus MRTP Order, supra note 24, at 1–2.
118. Snus MRTP Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 12.
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In addition, FDA’s findings about how the marketing of the MRTP snus
might affect consumer behaviors was based almost exclusively on a single
quantitative study conducted by the manufacturer that presented the immediate
responses of a sample of adult users and non-users to seeing a video delivering
the proposed MRTP claim relating to their understanding, perceptions, and
behavioral intentions.119 Basing such an important decision on a single
manufacturer study, without any replication or similar results from other nonindustry studies seems odd, especially as some journals will not even publish
research studies conducted by tobacco companies because of the enormous
conflicts of interest involved and past tobacco industry efforts to manipulate or
distort research to prevent or delay public health regulation.120 FDA does not
mention these possible problems, but FDA does note that an actual use study
would have provided more useful information about the claims effects on use
patterns.121 Indeed, FDA had previously recommended that the applicant conduct
an actual use study to address deficiencies in its original application; But the
Decision Summary does not explain why that was not required or not ultimately
necessary.122
FDA also noted several deficiencies with the study the applicant did
provide. For example; (1) the Decision Summary mentioned that the video in the
study was significantly different from the video the applicant proposes to use in
its marketing; (2) some parts of the survey instrument appeared to confuse some
respondents; (3) the study did not assess perceptions of risk from dual use
compared to exclusive smoking; (4) it did not provide information as to how
respondents who intended to buy the product expected to use it (e.g., for
complete switching, for dual use moving toward quitting smoking or instead of
quitting smoking, or as an alternative to quitting all use); (5) it did not provide
direct evidence that the proposed claim would encourage complete switching by
smokers; (6) it tested the proposed reduced-risk claim only when delivered via a
video; and (7) it did not include any evidence regarding responsive perceptions,
intentions, or behaviors among youth.123 Although FDA mentions each of these
119. Id. at 12–13, 29.
120. See, e.g., Ruth E. Malone, Changing Tobacco Control’s Policy on Tobacco Industry-Funded
Research, 22 TOBACCO CONTROL 1 (2013); A New Policy on Tobacco Papers, 7 PLOS MED. e1000237
(2010); The New International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health (IJERPH) Policy
Concerning Tobacco Company Funding, 15 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 2831 (2018). See
supra note 65 and accompanying text.
121. Snus MRTP Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 40, 41, 44.
122. Id. at 9, 16.
123. Id. at 17–18, 30–37, 40–43. The Decision Summary notes that the study’s testing of the
reduced-risk claim delivered as part of a comprehensive video with additional information and imagery
is “likely more engaging” than other possible formats and could therefore “reflect an upper bound of
effectiveness” of the claim in terms of beneficial impact on consumers—except that a broader marketing
plan with the reduced-risk claim “could have a larger impact than a single exposure (regardless of
impact).” Id. at 42. See also id. at 29–30. As the Decision Summary also recognizes, however, such a
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problems and there were certainly ways to address them in a timely fashion, FDA
did not require any remedial action by the applicant or take any action to develop
any of the missing information, itself.
In addition, the study did not provide a range of additional information that
would have enabled FDA to make a more informed evaluation and helped to
ensure that the reduced-risk claim would, if allowed, work effectively as
possible. For example, the study did not provide any data on the study
participants’ perceptions, intentions, or behaviors before seeing the video with
the reduced risk claim, which would have provided more insights into how the
reduced-risk claim (and the video factors other than the claim) impacted
perceptions and intentions. The study also did not provide any insights into the
proposed claim’s possible impacts on e-cigarette or IQOS use, did not ask the
smoker participants about their perceptions of whether the snus could actually
serve as a complete or satisfying smoking substitute (e.g., how important
inhaling was to them), and did not evaluate whether the claim had different
impacts on different key subpopulations, such as those with less education or
weaker English literacy or heavy versus lighter smokers. Moreover, the study did
not evaluate whether the claim would have been understood better and produced
stronger intentions to use the snus as a complete substitute for smoking if it had
referred to the listed risk reductions being secured when the snus were used as a
complete substitute for cigarettes rather than, as proposed, when used instead of
cigarettes.124 FDA neither discussed any of these shortcomings in the study nor
took any action to address them. Instead, FDA accepted the manufacturer’s
single study, as submitted, as adequate and persuasive.125
In addition, some of the study’s findings that the Decision Summary listed
as supporting FDA’s conclusion that granting the order would likely encourage
complete switching by some smokers were statistically insignificant.126 While
listing not-statistically-significant findings is common in research studies, FDA
is not a researcher reporting results but a regulatory agency evaluating research
to decide whether it would protect the public health to allow an addictive,
harmful tobacco product to be marketed with reduced risk claims. Accordingly,

broader reduced-risk marketing campaign could also increase youth use of the snus (and other harmincreasing uses of the snus) beyond what the video-based study suggests. Id. at 41, 43.
124. Id. at 29. As the Decision Summary notes, during the review of the MRTP application by
FDA’s Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee (TSPAC), members suggested that the
reduced-risk claim should use this alternative “switching completely” phrasing because “instead of”
seemed vague. Id. at 18. The Decision Summary also acknowledged the potential ambiguities and
problems with the “instead of” phrasing and considered whether the applicant’s study suggested any
significant problems. Id. at 29. But FDA did not require the applicant to show that “switching
completely” or any other phrasing would not work better than “instead of,” and FDA did not otherwise
investigate whether any other phrase might work better. Id. at 18.
125. See id. at 42.
126. Id. at 12, 40–42.
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it would be prudent for FDA to follow policy of not citing any research findings
to support a permissive MRTP order unless they are statistically significant.127
The study’s statistically significant findings indicated that, despite being
exposed to the reduced-risk claim video, significant numbers of consumers
inaccurately perceived that they could secure the snus lower disease risk while
still smoking numerous cigarettes or, conversely, that exclusively using the snus
was just as harmful as exclusively smoking.128 The study also found that
exposure to the reduced-risk video increased the number of respondents
inaccurately thinking that using the snus would be less harmful than using FDAapproved cessation aids and that using the snus would be less harmful than
quitting all tobacco-nicotine use.129 Yet FDA did not require that the applicant
do any tests to determine whether presenting the reduced-risk claim in different
ways or providing supplementary information (e.g., through product inserts,
onserts, or labeling) might reduce these problems and the related risk that the
snus would be used in harm-increasing ways.
More procedurally, the Decision Summary states that FDA considered all
comments submitted by interested parties relating to the MRTP application.130
But, unlike with the notice-and-comment process for FDA rulemaking, the
Decision Summary did not present any summary of the comments received or
provide any FDA responses.131 This lack of transparency makes it difficult to
127. It is also inconsistent for the Decision Summary to cite statistically insignificant increases to
stated intentions to purchase the snus by young adult smokers and adult smokeless tobacco users, in
response to seeing the reduced-risk claim video, to support FDA’s finding that issuing the MRTP Order
would produce harm-reducing complete switching while it also dismisses the not statistically significant
increases in former smokers stated intentions to purchase the snus as supporting “the conclusion that the
claim will not increase interest in the product among unintended groups. . .” Id. at 42. On the other hand,
it could have been reasonable for the FDA to use the study’s findings that seeing the video reduced
stated intentions to purchase the snus among young and old adult never tobacco users, but not to
statistically significant degrees, to support a finding that issuing the order would not increase snus use
among just those two groups. See id.
128. Id. at 35, 38.
129. Id. at 36.
130. Id. at 11. Numerous comments were submitted relating to the Swedish Match Snus MRTP. See
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Modified Risk Tobacco Product Applications: Applications for 10 Products
Submitted by Swedish Match North America Inc.; Availability,
www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2014-N-1051-0001 (last visited July 15, 2020). The Decision
Summary states that specific comments “are addressed in the Social Science review.” Snus MRTP
Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 19. But the Decision Summary does not summarize any Social
Science review of the comments or provide any information about how to access it. See id. Nor does any
Social Science review appear to be available via FDA’s website, as are all its other documents relating
to the snus MRTP Order. See Modified Risk Tobacco Products, Food & Drug Admin.,
https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/advertising-and-promotion/modified-risk-tobaccoproducts#Overview (last visited July 15, 2020).
131. The TCA requires FDA to seek public comments on MRTP, but not PMTA, applications, and
says nothing about FDA seeking comments on proposed MRTP or PMTA orders. See TCA, Pub. L. No.
111-31, sec. 101, § 911(e), 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387k(e) (2012)) (laying out
the requirement for MRTP). Although some redactions or other modifications might be necessary to
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determine whether FDA adequately considered comments that submitted
evidence and analysis contrary to FDA’s findings or Order. It also seems odd
that FDA would follow a less rigorous notice-and-comment process for allowing
new addictive and harmful tobacco products onto the U.S. market, especially
with relative-risk claims, than it follows for implementing rules to reduce
tobacco use harms more directly and powerfully, with less risk of harmful side
effects or harmful net impacts.
Even if FDA adequately considered all the relevant submitted comments,
the other omissions and problems with its evaluation of the snus MRTP
application do not provide an adequate or “not arbitrary or capricious” basis for
FDA’s determination that issuing the MRTP Order will “benefit the health of the
population as a whole” (or, more generally, be AFPPH).132 Although the snus
are clearly established as being among the least harmful types of tobacco
products (and considerably less harmful and risky than the IQOS products), it is
still difficult, if not impossible, to piece together a justification for FDA’s final
MRTP Order from the evidence and analysis presented in its Decision Summary.
Most fundamentally, FDA’s core finding that “the health benefits gained by
cigarette smokers (and potentially other smokeless tobacco users) switching to
[the snus] will not be outweighed by the health harms from nonusers initiating
new tobacco use” does not appear to consider a range of possible harmincreasing uses of the snus by smokers, such as snus use by smokers that prevents
or delays smoking or total cessation and the possibility that some initiation into
snus use by otherwise nonusers would evolve into more harmful tobacco use,
such as smoking.133
Even if we assumed that FDA actually meant that it had determined that the
health gains from smokers and more-harmful smokeless users who would not
otherwise quit smoking or all use switching to exclusively using snus (the only
ways snus use can produce health gains) would not be offset by all the different
health-harming ways the snus could be used, the Decision Summary does not
provide estimates or other evidence about the likelihood and size of all the
different possible harm-increasing uses to support that conclusion (even under
the most permissive legally viable interpretation of the AFPPH standard that
might be applied in this context). It is also clear from the Decision Summary that

protect any confidential and proprietary business information of the applicants that they did not want
disclosed, FDA could choose to make submitted PMTA applications and its own proposed final PMTA
and MRTP orders available for public comment and provide summaries of the comments and FDA’s
responses when issuing the final orders. If FDA had any concerns about revealing certain PMTAs before
it issued a final order—even after all proprietary business information had been redacted or even the
submitting company’s name had been redacted—FDA could still seek and receive helpful general public
comments on whether and under what conditions certain types (but not specific brands) of new products
should or should not be granted permissive PMTA orders.
132. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
133. Snus MRTP Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 12.
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FDA could have required the applicant to provide much more reliable and
comprehensive information to enable FDA to make less uncertain, more fully
informed findings about the various possible behavioral impacts and related
harms and risks, or FDA could have readily developed such additional
information, itself.
For all these reasons FDA’s evaluation of the snus MRTP and subsequent
determination that issuing the MRTP Order would be AFPPH (i.e., will benefit
the health of the population as a whole) was arbitrary or capricious in violation
of the Administrative Procedure Act.134
In addition, FDA’s expectations about the impact of issuing the Order on
different harm-increasing snus uses did not adequately consider the possibility
that issuing the Order and related publicity, the reduced-risk and other marketing
by the applicant, responsive actions by other members of the tobacco industry,
or other factors might dramatically change pre-existing use patterns among users
and nonusers well beyond what the applicant’s single perceptions and intentions
study indicated (e.g., to create a new youth and young adult snus-use fad). Had
FDA considered such risks more carefully and taken them more seriously, its
evaluation of the application would have been less arbitrary and capricious, and
FDA might have also made the Final Order more clearly AFPPH and not
arbitrary or capricious, as well.
V. FDA HAS FAILED TO INCLUDE READILY AVAILABLE MEASURES IN ITS
FINAL PMTA ORDERS THAT WOULD HAVE PREVENTED UNNECESSARY HEALTH
HARMS AND REDUCED THE RISK OF PRODUCING A NEGATIVE NET IMPACT ON
THE PUBLIC HEALTH
As already mentioned, the FDA decision summaries and orders
acknowledged that the marketing of the PMTA Philip Morris IQOS products and
the MRTP snus products would cause at least some risk of new youth initiation,
could cause much larger amounts of youth use or other harmful uses than
expected, and might produce a negative net impact on the public health or
otherwise turn out not to be AFPPH.135 Yet FDA did not take advantage of all
readily available ways to reduce those harms and risks or provide any
explanation for not doing so.
FDA did, however, take some partial steps in that direction. Because FDA’s
research review showed that consumers tend to underestimate the addiction risk
from IQOS, which could increase experimentation and initiation among nonusers
and decrease cessation among tobacco users, the FDA IQOS PMTA Order
specifically required a special nicotine-addiction warning on all IQOS heatstick

134. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.
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packages and advertising.136 In addition, the Decision Summary Appendix
discussed how tobacco product advertising and promotions, both generally and
through specific strategies, increase initiation and use among youth and
nonusers.137 To address that, the IQOS PMTA Order specifically required that
Philip Morris’s sponsorship be disclosed in any IQOS promotions done by thirdparties on its behalf, and that any Philip Morris social media or other electronic
advertising or sales of IQOS be done only with rigorous age and ID verification
in order to reduce youth exposure, access, and use.138 Based on exactly the same
concerns and analysis, FDA included the same requirements and restrictions in
its subsequent snus MRTP Order.139
However, while the age and ID requirements would also reduce exposure
to electronic advertising among adults unwilling to go through such verifications,
they did not close the door on electronic advertising that could increase harmful
IQOS use among adult nonsmokers and adult tobacco product users. Nor did
these electronic advertising provisions do anything to protect youth or adult
nonusers from the many other forms of advertising and promotions the decision
summaries appendices describe as increasing youth and nonuser use. Nor did
FDA include any other provisions in the IQOS PMTA Order or the subsequent
IQOS MRTP Order or snus MRTP Order to prevent or reduce harm-increasing
uses of the products among youth, nonusers, e-cigarette users, or smokers, other
than the nicotine warning statements required in the IQOS PMTA Order.140

136. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 87–89; IQOS PMTA Order, supra note 45,
at 13. See also IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 12, 98. But FDA could have made the
mandated warning even stronger by requiring black text on fluorescent yellow background, which would
have made it much more eye-catching than the order’s requirement of black on white or vice versa. See,
e.g., Laura K. Lempert & Stanton A. Glantz, Implications of Tobacco Industry Research on Packaging
Colors for Designing Health Warning Labels, 18 NICOTINE & TOBACCO. RES. 1910 (2016) (explaining
the impacts of color choices used in advertisements and warning labels).
137. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 111–20; See also id. at 12.
138. IQOS PMTA Order, supra note 45, at 14–15.
139. Snus MRTP Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 13, 64–77; Snus MRTP Order, supra note
24, at 13–14. Without explanation, the subsequent FDA PMTA Order allowing the marketing of the 20th
Century Group very-low-nicotine cigarettes did not include any such marketing restrictions. 22nd
Century PMTA Order, supra note 45. Apparently, FDA determined that it was AFPPH to allow the
highly toxic but not addicting cigarettes to be advertised and sold without rigorous age and ID
verification to reduce youth exposure and access, despite identifying only adult smokers as the intended
users. 22nd Century PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 61. Although all of FDA’s analysis
supporting its application of adult-only restrictions and sponsorship disclosures in the electronic
marketing of IQOS apply equally well to the marketing of the Swedish Match snus or any other harmful
and/or addictive tobacco product, FDA also did not retroactively apply them to the snus PMTA Order,
which included no advertising or marketing restrictions (perhaps because FDA planned on applying
them to the snus through the later MRTP order), and FDA has not initiated any rulemaking to apply the
restrictions more broadly.
140. See IQOS PMTA Order, supra note 45; IQOS MRTP Order, supra note 45; Snus MRTP Order,
supra note 24. Nor did the underlying Snus PMTA Order include any such restrictions or requirements.
See Snus PMTA Order, supra note 45.
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In the PMTA Order sent to Philip Morris, FDA observes that “you include
representations about your marketing plan for your products in the United States
and indicate that you intend to focus marketing on adult cigarette smokers while
limiting reach to unintended audiences.”141 But rather than include requirements
in the PMTA Order to ensure that Philip Morris would actually do just that, the
Order simply says that “FDA encourages you to consider measures to limit
youth-exposure to any of the products’ labeling advertising, marketing, and/or
promotion appearing in print media publications,” and says nothing about any
other forms of advertising that might prompt youth use or other use that increases
harms.142 The snus MRTP Order FDA sent to Swedish Match similarly
“recommends limiting youth-exposure to any of the tobacco products’ labeling,
advertising, marketing, and/or promotion appearing in print media publications”
and states that “we strongly recommend that you take measures to limit youth
initiation and use of the products, beyond limiting advertising and promotion as
required in this order,” without requiring any such efforts by Swedish Match.143
As things stand, there is nothing in the IQOS PMTA Order or the Snus
PMTA or MRTP Orders or other applicable federal laws or regulations to stop
Philip Morris or Swedish Match or retailers from marketing the products in a
variety of ways that could reach and attract youth and adult nonusers or
encourage harmful use of the products by current tobacco product users. For
example, to maximize sales and profits, the companies could market either
product as “a cool new way to use tobacco without smoking,” using ads visible
to youth and nonusers at retail outlets and other indoor locations or in magazines
and other publications. Or IQOS could be advertised as a “a new fun way to
‘smoke’ where smoking is prohibited” or as “more fun than Juul” or “more
141. IQOS PMTA Order, supra note 45, at 2.
142. Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, the snus IQOS Decision Summary notes that the Swedish
Match “proposes to use the claim in advertisements but does not plan to add it to the products’ labels,”
and plans to use a reduced-risk video different from the one in the study (which included other features
that appear to be unauthorized implied reduced-risk claims or illegal implied FDA approvals), and the
FDA appears to have based its evaluation on Swedish Match following suit. Snus MRTP Decision
Summary, supra note 45, at 10, 17–18, 30 n.4. But the FDA did not put any restriction in the Final Order
to ensure that Swedish Match would use the reduced-risk and market the snus as planned and not
implement any problematic changes. See Snus MRTP Decision Summary, supra note 45. Generally
speaking, if the application for a PMTA or MRTP order proposes to package, label, market, and sell the
applicant product in a certain way, and FDA bases its AFPPH determination on those proposals, it seems
quite odd, and arbitrary or capricious, for FDA not to require the applicant, at a minimum, to package,
label, market, and sell the product as proposed (or for FDA to put other restrictions and requirements in
the final order necessary to ensure the product is packaged, labeled, marketed, and sold in responsible,
AFPPH ways in the future).
143. Snus MRTP Order, supra note 24, at 14–15. The MRTP Order also requests that Swedish
Match annually provide FDA with summaries of “the implementation and effectiveness of any policies
and procedures regarding verification of the age and identity of purchasers of the products” and “the
implementation and effectiveness of any policies and procedures regarding restrictions on youth access
to the products,” but does not require any such reports or require that Swedish Match implement any
such policies or procedures. Id. at 15.
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satisfying than vaping.” Because snus are not subject to many restrictions and
requirements that apply only to cigarettes, the Swedish Match snus could also be
promoted through outdoor and indoor ads at or near locations where youth
congregate or in publications with heavy youth readerships.144 The snus could
also be advertised as “a way to use tobacco where you live, work, or play without
anyone being able to tell,” and could be sold in youth-affordable mini packs. In
addition, both the snus and IQOS could be advertised in a variety of ways to
former smokers who have quit all use as “a way to return to the joys of tobacco
without smoking.”145
While these examples might be unlikely, they are legal and possible, and
they show how existing legal constraints are inadequate to ensure responsible
marketing by Swedish Match, Philip Morris, or the tobacco industry in general.
Moreover, FDA’s own analysis and findings in the IQOS PMTA and Snus
MRTP Decision Summary Appendices show that tobacco product advertising
encourages youth, nonuser, and overall initiation and use even when done
without such obviously troublesome taglines, themes, or targeting.146 Indeed, the
snus MRTP Decision Summary says that to prevent youth use “it is essential that
modified risk marketing be targeted to current tobacco users and disseminated in

144. While there is no discussion on point, the IQOS PMTA Discussion Summary and Order assume
that the IQOS heatsticks fit under existing “cigarette” definitions in all federal government laws and
regulations placing taxes, restrictions, and requirements on cigarettes, and there has been no indication
that Philip Morris or any other party will contest that FDA finding. See, e.g. IQOS PMTA Decision
Summary, supra note 29, at 15, 74; IQOS PMTA Order, supra note 45, at 13 n.6 (assuming warning
label requirements that apply to combustible cigarettes apply to IQOS sticks, too). As cigarettes, IQOS
heatsticks cannot, for example, be sold with flavors other than tobacco or menthol or in packs of fewer
than 20 or be offered as free samples under federal law. TCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31, sec. 101, §
907(a)(1)(A), 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1)(A) (2012)); 21 C.F.R. § 1140.16
(2010) (restricting size of packages and offers of free samples). Under the settlement agreements
between the states and Philip Morris and most other cigarette companies, which have cigarette
definitions that parallel the federal definitions, the IQOS heatsticks, as cigarettes, cannot, for example,
be advertised in outdoor ads, except to a limited extent at retail outlets, or in publications with
substantial youth readerships. See Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, Summary of the Master Settlement
Agreement (MSA) (July 17, 2017), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/factsheets/0057.pdf
(describing the allowances and limitations of advertising). But these legal restrictions do not apply to
snus. FDA’s publicly available IQOS PMTA documents do not mention the settlement agreement
marketing restrictions that apply to the heatsticks as “cigarettes” or how they might reduce the risk of
future IQOS marketing that increases youth or nonuser use. FDA does state that “[a]s a cigarette
product, [h]eatsticks cannot be marketed with characterizing flavors aside from tobacco or menthol. . .
[which] may reduce the appeal to nonusers,” But FDA does not discuss any other federal restrictions or
requirements that apply to the heatsticks as “cigarettes.” IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note
29, at 74; See also id. at 76, 97.
145. Neither Swedish Match nor Philip Morris or any major retailers appear to have yet marketed the
IQOS or snus products in the United States in any such irresponsible or harm-increasing ways. But that
does not make FDA’s leaving the door open for them to do so any less imprudent and, therefore,
arbitrary or capricious.
146. See IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 111–16; Snus MRTP Decision
Summary, supra note 45, at 65–70
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ways to minimize exposure among youth.”147 It is also quite possible that the
companies will market the IQOS and the MRTP snus products quite aggressively
to maximize their sales and profits. In fact, the snus MRTP Decision Summary
notes that Swedish Match “proposes to include its claim in its advertising using
the following platforms: its branded website, print and online advertising, earned
media/public relations, direct mail, email, social media, and consumer activation
selling events in adult only facilities,” and FDA did not restrict its ability to do
so (other than placing age and ID verification requirements for electronic
marketing and sales).148
Had FDA decided to do more to ensure responsible marketing in its PMTA
and MRTP Orders and otherwise minimize exposure to the IQOS and snus
advertising among youth and others whose use could only be harmful, numerous
effective options were readily available. For example, FDA could have allowed
the snus on the market only as a substitute for addicted users of more harmful
tobacco products, and allowed IQOS as only a substitute for smokers, with
corresponding advertising restrictions. For instance, to reduce exposure to the
snus or IQOS advertising among those who could only be harmed by using the
products, FDA could have prohibited their advertising in publicly visible indoor
and outdoor ads or in ads in general-circulation magazines or other publications.
Going further, FDA could have restricted the products’ advertising only to
communications directed specifically at those who could benefit from using
them, such as ads at adult-only outlets specializing in tobacco-product sales (or
that sell only the snus or IQOS) and ads in direct communications (e.g., direct
mail, email, social media or hand-outs) provided only to pre-verified adults who
self-identify as current users of more harmful products or as users who had
already switched to the snus or IQOS.149

147. Snus MRTP Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 13. See id. at 43, 45, 48, 71–72 (discussing
advertising and impacts on youth). See also IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 115–18
(highlighting the importance of the marketing requirements and restrictions). While the decision
summaries focus a lot of protecting youth from the snus or IQOS marketing, almost nothing is said
about the need to protect nonusers, including former smokers or former users who might relapse into
using the IQOS or snus products, from such marketing or the need to ensure that the marketing that
reaches smokers or users of other more-harmful products does not encourage harm-increasing uses of
the products.
148. Snus MRTP Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 18.
149. A different strategy might have been to restrict the various forms of advertising that reach youth
and nonusers rather than prohibit them – e.g., by banning images or colors or permitting only black text
on white background except when necessary to convey accurate product information. But such an
approach would likely be much less effective at protecting against youth use or harm-increasing nonuser
use than available measures to minimize any youth or nonuser exposure to the ads in the first place. See,
e.g., Wilm Quentin et al., Advertising Bans as a Means of Tobacco Control Policy: A Systematic
Literature Review of Time-Series Analyses, 52 INT’L J. PUB. HEALTH 295, 305 (2007). Nevertheless,
including such advertising restrictions in the snus and IQOS PMTA Orders would have still provided
much stronger protections against both individual and net public health harms than the orders FDA
issued.
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FDA also could have required the products to be sold with additional
labeling and information that would reduce the risk that any youth or nonusers
exposed to the products or their advertising would begin using them, and also
reduce the likelihood that users of more-harmful tobacco products would use the
new products in ways that increased, rather than reduced, their tobacco-related
harms and risks (e.g., by preventing or delaying smoking or total cessation). For
example, FDA might have revised the new nicotine-addiction warning it required
for IQOS to also state that the product is meant only as a complete substitute for
smoking and any other use will increase harms or risks to the user’s health; and
FDA could have required a parallel notice on all of the Swedish Match snus
packaging and ads stating that it is meant only as a complete substitute for other
smoked, otherwise inhaled, or smokeless tobacco product use.150 In addition,
FDA could have required that both products be sold with package inserts that:
(1) provide instructions for how to use the product in harm-reducing ways
(including reducing nonuser exposure to IQOS); (2) describe the addictiveness,
harms, and risks from any other uses; explain the greater health benefits from
total cessation; and (3) inform users how they can obtain cessation assistance.151
By requiring such inserts or warnings for the snus, FDA could have also
directly addressed the many harmful misunderstandings consumers have about
snus, including those that viewing the snus relative risk claim video increased,
which FDA discussed in its snus MRTP Decision Summary but did nothing
about (e.g., that many consumers inaccurately think that using the snus is less
harmful than FDA-approved nicotine replacement therapies or complete
cessation or, conversely, is just as harmful as smoking, or that dual use secures
the same benefits as using only snus instead of smoking).152 It is also clear from
the IQOS PMTA Decision Summary that FDA was aware of research indicating
150. Requiring such warnings for IQOS would have simply been requiring a stronger version of text
Philip Morris was already using in an IQOS brochure provided to study participants, which stated that
“the product is intended for smokers who want to continue using tobacco and is not intended for use by
non-smokers.” IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 74.
151. For the Swedish Match snus PMTA, the Decision Summary included a statement
recommending “appropriate instructions for use.” Snus PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 34.
But FDA’s concern appears to have been only with making sure consumers understood that the snus
should be consumed in a different way than traditional U.S. smokeless tobacco products (e.g., different
mouth placement and expectoration), and the Final Order made no mention of instructions for use. Id. at
31, 39. The Philip Morris IQOS application provided an IQOS Tobacco Heating System User Guide and
IQOS Quick Start Guide, which Philip Morris presumably intended to include with the IQOS device
sold to consumers. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 85–86. FDA describes these
materials as instructing users only on how to operate, clean, and maintain the IQOS system. Id. at 85.
FDA concluded that some “additional support” Philip Morris intended to provide (details redacted) and
the instructions in the guides “should resolve most consumer issues related to the issue.” Id. at 86. But
the Final Order did not require Philip Morris to provide that support or those instructions and, as with
the snus, FDA did not consider requiring more detailed instructions regarding how to use the product to
reduce tobacco-related harms and risks, what uses would increase harms and risks, instead, and what
other options are available to users who want to reduce harms and risks even further.
152. See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text.
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that IQOS could be more harmful and risky to users than using e-cigarettes, but
that consumers tended to view the two different products as being similarly
risky.153 Accordingly, FDA could have required that IQOS have label warnings
or product inserts that informed consumers that switching to IQOS from ecigarettes could increase user harms and risks.
Another approach would have been for FDA to include provisions in the
PMTA and MRTP Orders to address all the specific harmful tobacco product
labeling and advertising features or tactics identified in the Decision Summary
Appendices, rather than just list certain ways that companies receiving PMTA or
MRTP orders “should” constrain their marketing to protect against youth use.154
For example, both Decision Summaries state that “firms receiving marketing
authorization for a new tobacco product should seek to reduce the youth-appeal
of the tobacco product’s labeling, advertising, marketing, and promotional
materials, including avoiding the use of imagery and themes known to resonate
with youth, such as aspirational content depicting tobacco use as ‘cool,’
attractive, rebellious, and/or risky, or as a means to make one more popular,
desirable, or independent.”155 But rather than just encourage such youthprotective marketing, FDA could have required it, and instead of merely
identifying harmful marketing tactics, FDA could have prohibited them.156

153. See IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 22, 88–89.
154. See id. at 116; Snus MRTP Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 70. Similarly, rather than just
requiring in the Final Order that Philip Morris and Swedish Match maintain records and report on any
policies, procedures, or actions it might implement “regarding restrictions on youth access to the
products” and to restrict youth-access and to “limit youth-exposure to the products’ labeling,
advertising, marketing, and/or promotion,” FDA could have required Philip Morris to develop such
policies, procedures, and actions, follow them, and ensure that any retailers selling IQOS followed the
policies and procedures, as well. IQOS PMTA Order, supra note 45, at 6–7, 10–12; Snus MRTP Order,
supra note 24, at 10–13.
155. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 116; Snus MRTP Decision Summary, supra
note 45, at 70.
156. See IQOS PMTA Order, supra note 45, at 6–7, 10–12; Snus MRTP Order, supra note 24.
Similarly, the PMTA and MRTP Orders require Philip Morris and Swedish Match to provide FDA with
copies of all new advertising, marketing, and/or promotional materials at least 30 days prior to their
publication for FDA’s review and comment, but “not for pre-approval.” IQOS PMTA Order, supra note
45, at 12–13; Snus MRTP Order, supra note 24, at 11. To better protect the public health, FDA could
have instead required the submission of any materially changed or new advertising and/or promotional
materials for pre-approval prior to any publication, at least whenever they included any new claims
about the IQOS or snus products or any other new descriptors or other new text or imagery that, based
on existing research on product marketing and consumer behavior, might reasonably be seen as creating
a new risk of attracting youth or promoting any harm-increasing uses of the product. See, e.g., Sabeeh
A. Bai et al., “Organic,” “Natural,” and “Additive-Free” Cigarettes: Comparing the Effects of
Advertising Claims and Disclaimers on Perceptions of Harm, 21 NICOTINE TOBACCO RES. 933 (2019);
Tatiana Basáñez et al., Vaping Associated with Healthy Food Words: A Content Analysis of Twitter, 8
ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. REP. 147 (2018). Or, FDA could have required that before being used any
materially changed or new labeling and ads must be submitted to FDA or to independent research
facilities for testing to ensure against their misleading consumers in ways that could increase productrelated harms. See, e.g., David M. Gardner & Nancy H. Leonard, Research in Deceptive and Corrective

LINDBLOM 1 (DO NOT DELETE)

1/24/2021 6:51 PM

2021] THE TOBACCO CONTROL ACT’S PMTA & MRTP PROVISIONS

165

Similarly, FDA notes that applicants could limit their tobacco products’ youth
appeal by “focusing marketing content on instructional demonstrations and
product comparisons and avoiding bright, bold, cheerful designs and colors,
which can influence youths’ product choices because these characteristics affect
their perception of the products, draw attention to them, and influence purchase
decisions.”157 But FDA did not take the logical next step to require Philip Morris
and Swedish Match to follow that approach.
In addition, the decision summaries observe that tobacco product
promotional items, celebrity endorsements, and links to cultural icons have been
found to increase youth use;158 and could have prohibited their use in any
marketing of IQOS or the Swedish Match snus. Similarly, the decision
summaries cite research finding that youth exposure to product displays and
advertising at point of sale, and to advertising in print, on television, or in movies
increases the risk of tobacco product use among youth and nonusers;159 and FDA
could have prohibited or restricted any such advertising for the snus or IQOS that
would directly reach numerous youth or nonusers, or even restricted their sale
and in-store advertising to adult-only tobacco-product sales outlets.160
FDA’s failure to even consider these or other available ways to reduce the
risk that its PMTA or MRTP orders would cause new individual health harms or
produce a negative net public health impact was “arbitrary or capricious” in
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.161 There also does not appear to
Advertising: Progress to Date and Impact on Public Policy, 12 CURRENT ISSUES & RES. ADVERT. 75
(1990); J. Edward Russo et al., Identifying Misleading Advertising, 8 J. CONSUMER RES. 119 (1981).
157. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 116; Snus MRTP Decision Summary, supra
note 45, at 70.The Decision Summaries also state that the products’ “labeling, advertising, marketing,
and promotional materials should be clearly tailored to appeal to adults by using personalization
strategies that make the content relevant and meaningful to adult recipients . . . without making them
look highly appealing or aspirational to other non-targeted populations, such as youth.” Id. (emphasis
added). Additionally, FDA could have included specific restrictions and requirements to help ensure
that all future labeling, advertising, marketing, and promotional materials for the IQOS and snus
products did that.
158. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 113; Snus MRTP Decision Summary, supra
note 45, at 66–67,72–73.
159. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 112–14; Snus MRTP Decision Summary,
supra note 45, at 65–68.
160. FDA has considered such adult-only sales restrictions in other tobacco product contexts. Prior
to releasing its decision allowing IQOS on the market, FDA proposed an enforcement strategy focusing
on enforcement against e-cigarettes on the market without permissive PMTA orders unless they
restricted the sale of their flavored brands (other than tobacco and menthol flavored) to adult-only stores
or adult-only areas in youth-accessible stores. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MODIFICATIONS TO
COMPLIANCE POLICY FOR CERTAIN DEEMED TOBACCO PRODUCTS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/121384/download. Without any clear explanation, however, that restriction
was not included in the final version of that guidance. See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
Guidance Document, supra note 16.
161. See supra notes 35–36, 102 and accompanying text. In fact, the FDA Decision Summaries for
the IQOS PMTA and the snus MRTP each state: “In this context, FDA should consider including
detailed marketing restrictions and requirements, in addition to other requirements for any product
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be any reasonable public health justification FDA could have provided either for
not considering them or for not including at least some of them in the final orders.
Indeed, it would have been appropriate for the protection of the public health for
FDA to have done so, both generally and as that phrase is defined in the statute.
The Tobacco Control Act gives FDA extensive authority to include product
and marketing restrictions and requirements in PMTA or MRTP orders, so long
as they will prevent new health harms and risks, reduce existing health harms
and risks, or otherwise be AFPPH.162 Accordingly, if FDA reasonably
determines that adding restrictions or requirements into a PMTA or MRTP order
is AFPPH, the only significant legal impediment is the First Amendment. But its
protections against excessive corporate speech restrictions or unreasonable
compelled corporate speech would not apply to any non-speech restrictions or
requirements FDA included in the orders. Nor would the First Amendment apply
to any speech-related restrictions or requirements FDA reasonably determined
were necessary to make allowing the products on the market permissible as
AFPPH.163 In addition, speech-related restrictions in PMTA orders that were not
necessary for an AFPPH determination would still be constitutionally valid if
they promoted the substantial government interest of preventing and reducing
individual or public health harms and risks and still left the manufacturers with
reasonable ways to communicate with their legal customers.164 Moreover, if

receiving a PMTA or MRTP authorization.” IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 119;
Snus MRTP Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 73. Yet the Decision Summaries provide no evidence
that FDA did that in any reasonable or comprehensive way in either case.
162. TCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31, sec. 101 §§ 910(c)(1)(B), 911(h)(5), 911(h)(1–2), 123 Stat. 1776
(codified 21 U.S.C. §§ 387j(c)(1)(B), 387k(h)(1), (2), (5) (2009)). See also, Lindblom, supra note 22,
at 531–32, 550–51. However, the TCA also leaves FDA free to reject inadequate PMTA or MRTP
applications and proposed orders rather than make any effort to fix them by inserting new restrictions
and requirements to make them AFPPH, and FDA has no obligation to consider any information or
analysis that might support the application or its proposed order other than what the application, itself,
offers. TCA, sec. 101 §§ 910(c)(2), 911(g)(1–3)(A) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 387j(c)(2), 387k(g)(1), (2),
(3)(A) (2009)).
163. If the courts could strike down a commercial speech restriction or requirement that FDA had
reasonably determined was necessary to include in the PMTA or MRTP order to enable FDA to find that
issuing it was AFPPH, FDA would have to withdraw the order as no longer AFPPH, preventing any
marketing of the subject product. But any speech restrictions or requirements necessary to make the
marketing of a product AFPPH would be no more extensive than necessary to achieve the substantial
government interest in issuing AFPPH tobacco control rules and would, therefore, under existing First
Amendment law, be constitutionally permitted. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 553–
65 (2001) (discussing the First Amendment’s relationship with commercial speech and the tobacco
industry).
164. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 553–65 (2001) (finding that a regulation of
speech cannot hinder an entity from proposing a commercial transaction or prevent the potential
consumer the opportunity to gather relevant information on the products). See also Disc. Tobacco City
& Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 537–48 (6th Cir. 2011) (rejecting First Amendment
challenges to the MRTP pre-market order process and to a range of speech-related restrictions and
requirements placed on cigarettes by the TCA, and suggesting how a TCA requirement that certain
cigarette ads be only black text on white background could be restructured to be constitutionally
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FDA had allowed the products on the market only as substitute products for
smokers and other users of more-harmful tobacco products, making them the
products’ only legal customers, that would have sharply reduced the scope of the
companies’ related First Amendment protections, as they would have no
constitutional right to advertise to illegal customers, including non-smokers and
youth.165 FDA could have also avoided possible First Amendment compelledspeech problems with any required warnings or product inserts or onserts, even
if they were not necessary for FDA’s AFPPH determination, by ensuring that
they were clearly marked as coming from FDA, not the companies, and were
designed to convey accurate product-related information relevant to potential or
actual users (as opposed to explicitly discouraging their use by legal customers
or engaging in scare tactics or other emotional manipulation).166
Because it might be seen as impeding rather than advancing the TCA’s goal
of reducing tobacco-related public health harms (the relevant substantial
government interest for constitutional analysis), both the First Amendment and
the AFPPH standard might invalidate a speech-related restriction or requirement
placed in a PMTA or MRTP order to reduce related health harms and risks if it
were clear that the restriction or requirement would also disproportionately
reduce the likelihood and size of the expected net public health gains from the
order.167 But FDA could avoid those risks simply by including in the orders only
the many available restrictions and requirements (such as those described above)
that, based on available information and analysis, FDA reasonably determined
would reduce the health harms and risks from allowing the product’s marketing
without reducing the expected net public health gains to any significant extent.
Despite being able to get around First Amendment constraints, FDA might
argue that including strong additional restrictions and requirements in the PMTA
orders did not make sense or was unfair because it would be regulating lessharmful tobacco products much more rigorously than more harmful tobacco
products, including cigarettes. But, as discussed above, FDA has already
included restrictions and requirements on the marketing of IQOS and the
Swedish Match snus that are more strict than existing restrictions on the
permitted). For a more detailed analysis of related case law in the parallel situation of FDA PMTA
orders for applicant e-cigarettes, see Eric N. Lindblom, Effectively Regulating E-Cigarettes and Their
Advertising—and the First Amendment, 70 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 57, 81–91 (2015).
165. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 571; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980); Lindblom, supra note 164.
166. See, e.g., Eric N. Lindblom et al., FDA-Required Tobacco Product Inserts & Onserts – and the
First Amendment, 72 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 1, 11–22 (2017).
167. It is also possible, however, that avoiding the production of brand-new health harms and risks
to persons who would not otherwise be harmed or put at risk by including such a restriction or
requirement in the final orders could be AFPPH (depending on how FDA and the courts interpret the
remaining gray areas of the standard) and could be seen as promoting a separate substantial government
interest in not causing brand-new harms or risks to innocent people, so long as the final order still
produced some significant net public health gain. See, e.g., Lindblom, supra note 164.
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marketing of more-harmful smoked tobacco products.168 Indeed, the AFPPH
standard cares only about whether issuing the order will produce a beneficial net
public health impact. If new restrictions or requirements added into the order will
prevent or reduce new health harms and risks from the product’s marketing or
increase the likelihood or size of related harm reductions, the fact that they are
more strict than those other existing laws or regulations place on more harmful
tobacco products is irrelevant. In addition, there is nothing stopping FDA (other
than possible political obstacles within the Administration) from concurrently
issuing a proposed rule to place parallel requirements and restrictions on some
or all other tobacco products when it issues a PMTA order. For example, FDA
could have used all of the evidence and analysis provided in the decision
summaries to support the PMTA and MRTP orders’ requirement that any
electronic advertising or sales of the IQOS or snus products be done with
rigorous age and ID verification to support a concurrent or subsequent proposed
rule to subject all other tobacco products to that same requirement.169 However,
it could not be AFPPH to allow a new PMTA or MRTP product to be marketed
in avoidable harm-increasing ways while FDA goes through the typically long
process of developing, implementing, and enforcing a final rule that would apply
both to the PMTA and MRTP products and other harmful and addictive tobacco
products, rather than including measures in the final PMTA or MRTP orders to
prevent and reduce such harmful marketing of the PMTA and MRTP products
from the start 170
Although not mentioned in the Decision Summaries, it is also possible that
FDA believed that including any additional, legally permissible restrictions and
requirements in the PMTA or MRTP Orders was unnecessary or not worth doing
because the new individual or public health harms or risks created by the
marketing of the Swedish Match snus or Philip Morris IQOS were low or
unlikely and post-market surveillance could identify any unexpected higher
168. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
169. IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 111–20; Snus MRTP Decision Summary,
supra note 45, at 64–75 (providing the analyses that FDA could have used to support such a
requirement).
170. It would also be counterproductive (and irrelevant for qualifying an order as AFPPH) for FDA
to allow a PMTA or MRTP tobacco product on the market, after finding that it would create unnecessary
individual and public health harms and risks, based on an asserted FDA preference to rely on its own
concurrent or future public education campaigns to prevent and reduce those harms and risks rather than
include restrictions or requirements in the final orders that would prevent and reduce them earlier or
more effectively and certainly. Taking on that burden to counteract harm-increasing product marketing
that could simply have been prevented in the first place and using limited FDA tobacco control
resources for those purposes, simply does not make sense. It is also unlikely that FDA could develop,
implement, and sustain a counter-marketing public education campaign that would work as effectively
as placing marketing restrictions and requirements in the order. Moreover, it would be much more
AFPPH for FDA both to include the restrictions and requirements in the PMTA and MRTP orders and
develop and run the complementary public education campaigns, which would work to reduce tobacco
use and its harms even more quickly and powerfully, rather than just do the latter.
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amounts of youth initiation or other harm-increasing uses, at which point FDA
could take remedial action to stop or reduce those harms and risks. Or perhaps,
FDA believed that post-market surveillance and the threat of revoking the PMTA
or MRTP Orders would be enough to ensure responsible marketing and low
levels of new youth initiation or other harm-increasing uses. As already
described above, there are some fundamental problems with FDA’s findings or
expectations of low risks or low harms from the marketing of the IQOS products
and the MRTP snus.171 But, even if we put that aside, any FDA reliance on postmarket surveillance and possibly withdrawing or amending the final orders to
address unanticipated new harms that might emerge is still both procedurally and
substantively flawed as well as legally impermissible.
Most fundamentally, it could not be AFPPH, under any viable interpretation
of the standard, to create any new health harms or risks by allowing the marketing
of the snus or IQOS products if their likelihood and size could easily be reduced
effectively through including additional, readily available restrictions or
requirements in the PMTA orders – especially if that would not reduce or
increase the likelihood and size of the expected net public health gains. Nor could
it be AFPPH to allow new health harms to occur and only afterwards take action
to prevent or reduce them rather than implement readily available measures to
prevent or reduce the likelihood and size of the possible new harms from the
start.
Closing the barn door only after the horses have bolted is even more
problematic considering how long it typically takes FDA to initiate effective
preventive or remedial tobacco control action, if it does so at all, even when faced
with a health emergency or crisis or a public health disaster.172 FDA’s record for
enforcement against specific tobacco product manufacturers or brands if they
violate the TCA, other provisions of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, or related
rules is also weak. Enforcement is typically done, when done at all, quite slowly,
only after a lengthy process of warning letters, responses, consultations, and
opportunities for the manufacturer to implement corrective actions.173 The extent

171. See supra notes 93–102, 112–134 and accompanying text.
172. For example, despite having extensive powers and authorities to do so since 2009, the FDA has
yet to implement a substantive rule to reduce the close to half a million premature deaths that occur each
year from smoking in the United States. Nor has the FDA yet issued a rule, even in just proposed form,
to address the sharp increase in youth e-cigarette use that FDA labeled an “epidemic” and a “crisis” in
the Fall of 2018. See, e.g., FDA Statement, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Statement from FDA
Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on Meetings with Industry Related to the Agency’s Ongoing Policy
Commitment to Firmly Address Rising Epidemic Rates in Youth E-cigarette Use (Oct. 31, 2018),
www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/statement-fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-mdmeetings-industry-related-agencys-ongoing-policy (last visited July 15, 2020).
173. For instance, while the FDA has issued tens of thousands of warning letters to tobacco product
retailers, often with related press announcements, it has sent relatively few to manufacturers or
importers, and even fewer relating to major brands, with very few FDA press announcements of either
positive resolutions or follow-up FDA enforcement actions. See Warning Letters, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
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to which this lack of FDA clarity in taking effective enforcement or other
regulatory action is from internal FDA factors or from lack of support or
impediments from the White House, the Office of Management and Budget, or
other federal agencies is not clear. But it is clear that FDA does not have a strong
record for taking quick remedial action in the tobacco control context.
Even if FDA did promptly notice that the marketing of a new PMTA or
MRTP product had turned out to be not AFPPH and quickly decided to withdraw
the original order, the statute does not provide for quick remedial action. For
withdrawing a PMTA order, the TCA requires “due notice and opportunity for
informal hearing” and, “where appropriate, advice on scientific matters from the
Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee,” and allows the holder of the
PMTA or order to appeal any FDA decision to withdraw the order, which could
produce further delays; withdrawing an MRTP order also requires an opportunity
for an informal hearing; and other TCA provisions and other laws and rules
provide manufacturers with other due process and appeal rights.174 If the
withdrawal of the PMTA or MRTP order meant to stop the sale of the product or
ADMIN., www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations/complianceactions-and-activities/warning-letters; Press Announcements, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-newsroom/press-announcements (last visited July 15, 2020). Yet there is
strong evidence that major manufacturers and major brands have been violating the TCA or related
rules. See, e.g., Erik K. Soule et al., Major Online Retailers Selling Electronic Cigarettes as Smoking
Cessation Products in the USA, TOBACCO CONTROL (Aug. 30, 2019) and Letter from Am. Cancer Soc’y
et al. to Dr. Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.
(Oct. 14, 2015) (regarding e-cigarettes being marketed with therapeutic claims without required prior
FDA approval); Letter from Action on Smoking and Health to Mr. Mitchell Zeller, Dir., Ctr. for
Tobacco Prods., U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Feb. 26, 2016) (explaining major tobacco companies
introducing new tobacco products into the market without required FDA pre-market review and
permissive new product orders); Letter from Matthew M. Myers, President, Campaign for Tobacco Free
Kids to Ann Simoneau, Dir., Office of Compliance and Enf’t, Ctr. for Tobacco Prods., U.S. Food &
Drug Admin. (May 26, 2016) (regarding FDA warning letter sent to Reynolds American, Inc. and its
subsidiary Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co. for the marketing of Natural American Spirit brand cigarettes
in violation of the TCA’s modified risk provisions not having prompted any remedial changes or FDA
enforcement action); Letter from Am. Acad. of Pediatrics et al., to Dr. Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, U.S.
Food & Drug Admin. (Aug. 7, 2018) (regarding e-cigarettes being marketed in violation of the TCA and
the FDA Deeming Rule). See also Comments Submitted to the FDA by the Campaign for Tobacco-Free
Kids and Partners, www.tobaccofreekids.org/what-we-do/us/fda/comments-letters (last visited July 15,
2020) (providing records of these and other letters from public health groups that present evidence of
violations by tobacco product manufacturers). FDA’s 2015 warning letter regarding Natural American
Spirit brand cigarettes being marketed with illegal reduced-risk claims ultimately produced a settlement
agreement between FDA and the manufacturer in 2017, but the agreement has been criticized for
permitting the continuing use of terms and phrases in the brand’s advertising that violate the TCA. See,
e.g., Stefanie K. Gratale et al., Regulating Language, Not Inference: An Examination of the Potential
Effectiveness of Natural American Spirit Advertising Restrictions, 28 TOBACCO CONTROL 43 (2019).
174. TCA, sec. 101 § 910(d)(1–2) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387j(d)(1–2)); TCA, sec. 101 § 911(j)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387k(j)). See also TCA, sec. 101 § 912(a) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387l(a)); 21
C.F.R. 10.75. The TCA says nothing about FDA amending a previously issued PMTA order allowing a
product on the market. But the FDA could, presumably, withdraw an issued order, following the
required procedures, while notifying the manufacturer that a new, revised version of the order would be
issued concurrently with the initial order’s withdrawal.

LINDBLOM 1 (DO NOT DELETE)

1/24/2021 6:51 PM

2021] THE TOBACCO CONTROL ACT’S PMTA & MRTP PROVISIONS

171

require changes to the product, its packaging, or labeling, it is also likely that
FDA would allow retailers, distributors, and manufacturers to exhaust existing
inventories, first.175 In addition, any continuing illegal marketing or sales of the
products after the PMTA order was revoked or amended would likely be
addressed through FDA’s normal system of warning letters and related
procedures before the products were actually pulled off the market, further
adding to the time before the unexpected or unanticipated health harms would be
effectively addressed.176
Adding to these inevitable delays, the post-market surveillance and
reporting FDA has required from Philip Morris and Swedish Match is inadequate
for enabling FDA to determine quickly whether the actual marketing of IQOS or
snus products is causing greater harms than expected or is not AFPPH. For
example, the PMTA and MRTP Orders require Philip Morris and Swedish Match
to establish and maintain records and make reports about policies and procedures
and advertising and marketing plans pertaining to “regarding restrictions on
youth access to the products” and efforts to “restrict youth-access and limit
youth-exposure to the products’ labeling, advertising, marketing, and/or
promotion.”177 But there is no mention of requiring any recordkeeping or reports
about polices or actions pertaining to restricting access to products or reducing
exposure to labeling, advertising and promotion among non-youth who would be
harmed by using IQOS, to otherwise prevent use of IQOS by those who can only
be harmed, or to ensure that smokers use IQOS in ways that reduce rather than
increase harms and risks.
The orders do require the companies to: (1) keep records relating to the sale,
distribution, or other disposition of the products, including any information about
purchasers “previous or current use of other tobacco products (i.e., dual use);”
(2) keep records of all clinical or nonclinical studies done by the companies
pertaining to the products, including consumer evaluation research studies; and
(3) report annually on any significant findings in new publications, including any
new scientific data (published or otherwise), including, for IQOS, “on the
likelihood of product use by current users of tobacco products within the same
tobacco product category, current users of tobacco products in other tobacco
product categories, former users of any tobacco product, and youth and young

175. For example, the FDA’s Proposed Rule requiring graphic health warnings for cigarette
packages would only prohibit manufactures from introducing non-complying packs into the U.S. market
after a specific future date, with distributors and retailers allowed to exhaust their inventories of
noncomplying cigarettes after that. Tobacco Products; Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and
Advertisements, 84 Fed. Reg. 42754, 42784–85. (Aug. 15, 2019) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
176. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations/compliancemanuals/regulatory-procedures-manual#_top.
177. IQOS PMTA Order, supra note 45, at 6–7, 9–13; Snus MRTP Order, supra note 24, at 10–13,
15, 17.
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adults” and, for the snus, “regarding the MRTPs and consumer perception,
behavior, or health.”178 But they do not require that Philip Morris or Swedish
Match actually initiate any data collection or research relating to the products
and any related health harms and risks to exclusive users or dual users, either
generally or in comparison to smoking or other forms of tobacco-nicotine use, or
relating to whether the products’ marketing is promoting more harm-increasing
uses than harm-reducing uses. As a result, there are no requirements in the orders
to ensure that FDA would be promptly be alerted to any and all unexpected
product users or harms from the products’ use that would show that the orders
must be amended or revoked to adequately protect the public health.179
Moreover, if FDA intended to rely on the possibility that the PMTA or
MRTP Orders would be rescinded to ensure that Philip Morris and Swedish
Match would market the IQOS and snus products responsibly and that take
additional action to ensure that their marketing would produce larger public
health gains than losses, FDA could have made that rescission a more certain,
specific, and effective threat. For example, FDA could have stated that the orders
would automatically be revoked if certain surveys or data sources showed that
significantly more youth than adults were using the products or that significantly
more nonusers than existing users of more harmful tobacco products were
initiating into regular use. Or, FDA could have stated that it would quickly
revoke the orders if it became clear that the marketing or the products was
preventing or delaying total cessation or smoking cessation more than it was
increasing total switching from smoking or other more harmful tobacco use by
those who would not otherwise quit, or was prompting more otherwise non-using
youth to initiate into regular use of the products than youth who would otherwise
have been smokers or used other more-harmful tobacco products.
However, even with much more comprehensive post-market surveillance
requirements and clearly stated standards or triggers for revoking the PMTA
Orders, any related revocation or amendment of the PMTA Orders to stop or
reduce any unexpected harms would still be unnecessarily allowing new harms
to occur before doing anything about them. By including readily available
restrictions and requirements in the orders, FDA could have prevented all or
some of these harms and risks from ever occurring in the first place without
significantly reducing (and often increasing) the net public health gains from
issuing the orders. Taking a stitch in time to save nine is a solid public health
principle, and FDA’s failure to do so by including effective restrictions and

178. IQOS PMTA Order, supra note 45, at 6, 10; Snus MRTP Order, supra note 24, at 8, 10–11, 16.
179. See IQOS PMTA Order, supra note 45; Snus MRTP Order, supra note 24. It is possible that the
FDA plans also to rely on some other sources of data and research to provide prompt notice of
unexpected harms or harm-increasing uses. But that is not mentioned anywhere in the decision
summaries or final orders.
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requirements to prevent unnecessary harm-increasing uses of the snus and IQOS
products was both not AFPPH and “arbitrary and capricious.”180
VI. FDA’S GUIDANCE AND PROPOSED RULE RELATING TO PMTAS NEITHER
CLARIFY THE REMAINING GRAY AREAS OF THE AFPPH STANDARD NOR
SUGGEST THAT FUTURE FDA PMTA EVALUATIONS AND ORDERS WILL BE
AFPPH OR NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS
Since issuing its PMTA Orders for the IQOS and snus products, FDA has
issued a Final Guidance for Industry relating to securing PMTA orders for ecigarettes and, on September 25, 2019, published a much more detailed Proposed
Rule pertaining to PMTA applications and orders.181 Neither provides any
assurance that FDA’s future PMTA orders allowing new tobacco products on the
market will be AFPPH or “not arbitrary or capricious,” or that the underlying
PMTA evaluations will not be “arbitrary or capricious. But they do, at least,
suggest that future FDA PMTA and MRTP evaluations might be more
comprehensive than those done for the Swedish Match snus and Philip Morris
IQOS products.
As in its PMTA and MRTP Orders, FDA acknowledges in the proposed
rule that its AFPPH determinations could turn out to be inaccurate, implicitly
adopting an interpretation of the AFPPH standard that permits the marketing of
products that create risks of producing a net harm to the public health.182 But the
Proposed Rule does not explain or justify that interpretation, and provides scant
guidance as to how much more likely or larger the expected net gain from issuing
a permissive PMTA order must be to justify running a risk of a negative net
public health impact. In this regard, the Proposed Rule does say that:
Generally, FDA intends to consider the marketing of a new tobacco
product to be [AFPPH] where a PMTA contains sufficient valid
scientific evidence to demonstrate that the potential risks and benefits

180. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Even if failing to include readily available measures
in the final PMTA orders that would reduce acknowledged or obvious health risks and harms caused by
allowing the products on the market could somehow be AFPPH and not “arbitrary or capricious,” FDA’s
failure even to consider those obvious and readily available health-protecting measures and provide a
reasonable explanation for how allowing the products on the market without them was AFPPH would
still be “arbitrary and capricious.” See supra notes 102, 35 and accompanying text.
181. See Final PMTA Guidance, supra note 12; Premarket Tobacco Product Applications and
Recordkeeping Requirements, 84 Fed. Reg. 50,556 (Sept. 25, 2019) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts.
1100, 1107, 1114) [hereinafter Proposed PMTA Rule]. Guidance documents are typically non-binding
statements of current agency policies or practices, including recommendations for what subject entities
could or should do to comply with underlying laws or regulations. While the documentation for
proposed and final rules can also include non-binding agency policy statements, the text of the rule
itself, when put into final form and implemented, establishes legally binding requirements and
restrictions.
182. See Proposed PMTA Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. at 50,581, 50,620–21, 50,623. The PMTA Final
Guidance does not discuss this issue.
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of the marketing of the new tobacco product would have a net positive
effect on the health of the population as a whole,” which “requires a
balancing of product-specific potential risks and benefits.”183
It also states that a PMTA product would receive a no marketing order if “the
product is not likely to have a net benefit to the population as a whole.184 But
FDA provides no clarification as to how that balancing will be done or what “not
likely” means. A later section of the Proposed Rule indicates that, after reviewing
the PMTA applications, FDA will make its AFPPH determinations based on its
understanding of the health risks from the products use and on how it expects
consumers to respond to its marketing.185 Yet FDA provides no clarification as
to how certain or positive those understandings or expectations need to be to
support an AFPPH determination (or how the risk of producing a negative net
public health impact factors in).
This continued FDA failure to clarify how it will interpret and apply the
AFPPH standard in the PMTA context is discouraging. Until the FDA staff have
a clear, reasonable interpretation of the standard to apply, it will remain difficult,
if not impossible, for them to review and evaluate PMTA applications or
structure permissive PMTA orders in a “not arbitrary or capricious” manner.
It is also highly unlikely that a PMTA or MRTP order could be AFPPH if
it allowed the marketing of a tobacco product without requiring readily available
product changes or labeling or marketing restrictions that would reduce related
health harms and risks without disproportionately reducing the expected net
public health gain – and such an order would, in any case, be “arbitrary or
capricious.”186 Yet nothing in the Proposed Rule or Final Guidance states that
FDA must reject applications that have not taken advantage of readily available
measures to make the new tobacco product and its packaging, labeling, and
marketing as minimally harmful and risky as possible, without interfering with
the product’s ability to serve as a less-harmful alternative to other tobacco use
and secure related net public health gains. Nor is there any text that strongly
suggests that FDA will do so. Instead, the Proposed Rule states that applicants
“may choose” to propose restrictions on the distribution, advertising, promotion,
or sale of the new tobacco product “to help support” a showing that its marketing
would be AFPPH;187 and the text of the Proposed Rule, itself, only reiterates
183. Id. at 50,618.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 50,603.
186. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
187. Proposed PMTA Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. at 50,580. See also id. at 50,655 (proposing new 21 C.F.R.
§ 1114.31(b)(2), which allows FDA to include restrictions in the PMTA order that the applicant
proposed “to help FDA” make an AFPPH finding); Final PMTA Guidance, supra note 12, at 12 (stating
that applicant “may propose specific restrictions on sale and distribution that can help support a showing
that permitting the marketing of the product would be APPH”). The Proposed Rule also states:
“Consistent with its mission to protect the public health, FDA seeks to limit youth exposure to the
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FDA’s authority under the TCA to include such restrictions in the final PMTA
orders.188
As for requiring applicants to make their new tobacco products less harmful
or risky, the Proposed Rule requires applicants only to identify the measures they
have taken to reduce or eliminate those risks associated with the design of the
tobacco product and packaging “not normally associated with the use of the
tobacco product.”189 Similarly, the Proposed Rule focuses on how the product’s
labeling (including inserts, onserts, instructions, and warnings) should not be
false or misleading and should work to ensure consumers operate the product
correctly, but says nothing about how the labeling should promote harmreducing use and discourage harm-increasing uses.190 Although both documents
discuss how applicants must and should provide certain information regarding
the product’s components, ingredients, additives, and constituents, including
information regarding purity or contamination, neither recommends or requires
any action by applicants to minimize contamination or to eliminate any
unnecessary additives that make the product more harmful or potentially
harmful.191
As previously discussed, two of the major difficulties with making AFPPH
determinations are the considerable uncertainties relating to the long-term
harmfulness or comparative harmfulness of new products to different types of
users, and the inescapable difficulties in predicting future industry and consumer
behaviors relating to the new product that could increase or reduce health harms.
But the size and scope of the most problematic aspects of these uncertainties
labeling, advertising, marketing, or promotion of a new tobacco product in order to limit uptake of the
new tobacco product by nonusers of tobacco products, especially youth.” Proposed PMTA Rule, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 50,580. But the closest FDA comes to requiring applicants to propose or incorporate
requirements and restrictions to prevent such unnecessary marketing to youth is when the Proposed Rule
states that in certain situations FDA may be unable to determine that allowing the marketing of the new
tobacco product is AFPPH if the applicant does not propose to address youth access to the product and
exposure to its marketing and related youth initiation (e.g., by selling the product solely in adult-only
establishments or using age-verification controls for digital advertising). Id. at 50,581.
188. Proposed PMTA Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. at 50,655. See also id. at 50,581 (stating that “where FDA
determines that restrictions on the sales and distribution of the new tobacco product (including access to,
and the advertising and promotion of, the tobacco product) would be APPH, FDA can impose such
restrictions under the terms of a marketing order”) (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 50,596. See also Final PMTA Guidance, supra note 12, at 16 (recommending measures to
prevent harms from exposure to the applicant e-cigarette’s nicotine liquids by children and others,
separate from inhalation during the product’s use).
190. Proposed PMTA Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. at 50,580, 50,607. See also Final PMTA Guidance, supra
note 12, at 22–23.
191. See Final PMTA Guidance, supra note 12, at 26–30; Proposed PMTA Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. at
50,644. Indeed, FDA implies that, in regard to harmfulness to users, it is enough for a new product to
qualify as AFPPH if it “delivers significantly lower levels of a specific HPHCs to users than the tobacco
products they are currently consuming, which studies indicate may result in decreased morbidity and
mortality,” even if it could be made less harmful and risky without reducing its use as a less-harmful
substitute for other tobacco product use. Id. at 50,579.
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would be sharply reduced if applicants were required to take all readily available
steps to make the products as minimally harmful as possible (without interfering
with their ability to serve as effective less-harmful substitutes for more harmful
tobacco use) and if the final order included all effective product, labeling,
marketing, and sales restrictions and requirements that would help prevent or
discourage harm-increasing consumer uses while still allowing for or
encouraging harm-reducing uses. However, the Proposed Rule and Final
Guidance: (1) do not discuss these uncertainty problems, (2) do not require
applicants to take any of these actions, (3) do not otherwise propose any
measures to shrink the size or scope of these troublesome uncertainties by
reducing the underlying risks, and (4) do not provide any clear guidance on what
else applicants must or should do to reduce the likelihood and size of the
uncertain health risks that could be caused allowing the PMTA product’s
marketing. Nor do the FDA documents provide any clear insights as to how FDA
will shrink or otherwise substantively address these uncertainties when making
its AFPPH determinations, given that it is not requiring that the PMTA products
be made as minimally harmful as possible nor mandating or planning that PMTA
orders include all effective restrictions and requirements that will reduce
unnecessary health harms or risks. Instead, FDA simply provides requirements
or guidance about what kind of research and data should be provided.192
The Proposed Rule also indicates that FDA will continue to make its
AFPPH determinations based on an assumption that applicants will market the
PMTA products as proposed in the application in the short-term and then
192. For example, in a number of places, the Proposed Rule states that in some cases there may be
gaps in the existing scientific information relating to certain topics that the applicant might need to fill
by conducting its own investigations to make it possible to demonstrate that allowing the marketing of
the product would be AFPPH. See, e.g., Proposed PMTA Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. at 50,556, at 50,599,
50,602–07, 50,615. But FDA provides little guidance as to when the “full reports of all information . . .
published or known to, or which should reasonably be known to, the applicant” required by the proposed
rule for each of the various application topic and sub-topic areas would be sufficient to demonstrate that
the product’s marketing would be AFPPH or when the applicant would need to develop additional data
or research. Id. at 50,650 (proposing new 21 C.F.R. § 1114.7(k)). The Proposed Rule says only that the
applicant would need to conduct its own investigations if there were no information available on the
specific topic or subtopic, and that the provided reports of all available information, including any done
by the applicant, must be sufficient for FDA to “be able to determine the potential risks and benefits to
the population as a whole.” See id. at 50,605–07. See also id. at 50,602, 50,618–19. In regard to
predicting how consumers will actually respond to the future marketing of the new product, FDA does
say that if it “is unable to determine the impact that the labeling, advertising, marketing, and promotion
of the new tobacco product may have on consumer perceptions and use intentions, FDA intends to issue
a no marketing order for the new tobacco product.” Id. at 50,606 (emphasis added). That suggests that
when actual consumer use data is not available, FDA will be relying primarily on pre-application studies
of consumer perceptions and use intentions (e.g., when presented with possible future labeling or
advertising) to develop its estimates of how consumer will actually behave in the future. See also id. at
50,582, 50,606, 50,610, 50,616, 50,651 (proposing new 21 C.F.R. § 1114.7(k)(iv)), 50,655 (proposing
new 21 C.F.R. § 1114.27(b)(ii)(G)). But FDA does not explain how it will develop its estimates of
future consumer behaviors based on the perception and intended use studies and other relevant
information.
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continue to market them responsibly thereafter (without requiring that they do
so).193 Rather than prevent all clearly harmful marketing in the first place, the
Proposed Rule, like the Swedish Match snus MRTP and Philip Morris IQOS
PMTA Orders, appear to rely primarily on FDA requiring successful applicants
to provide periodic reports of marketing data and information and in some cases
require advance notice of marketing changes (but not prior FDA permission) to
prevent the companies from marketing in legal but irresponsible ways.194 This
indirect constraint, with FDA able to take legal action to stop irresponsible
advertising only after it has caused related harms, is much less effective than
either restricting harmful forms of advertising in the first place or requiring prior
FDA permission before any major labeling or advertising changes may be
implemented.195
More constructively, the Proposed PMTA Rule and Final PMTA Guidance
do indicate that FDA might evaluate future applications in a more comprehensive
way than it evaluated the Swedish Match and Philip Morris PMTAs by actually
considering more of the health impacts from all the different potential harmincreasing uses and harm-reducing uses of proposed new PMTA products.
Besides making it clear that whether or not the marketing of a new product is
AFPPH will depend on its net impact on the public health,196 FDA states that the
Proposed Rule would require PMTA’s to contain an “in-depth analysis and
discussion” of the effect the marketing of the new product will have on the health
of the population as a whole “by integrating all of the information (both
qualitative and quantitative as available) regarding the product, its potential
effects on health, as well as tobacco use behavior, including likelihood of
cessation and initiation, to provide an overall assessment of the potential effect
that the marketing of the tobacco product may have on overall tobacco-related
morbidity and mortality.”197 Even more specifically, the Proposed Rule states
that the PMTA summary must contain a discussion of the:

193. Id. at 50,580–82, 50,643 (proposing new 21 C.F.R. §1114.7(f)(2)).
194. Id. at 50,581, 50,620, 50,623, 50,655–56 (proposing new 21 C.F.R. § 1114.31(b)(3), §
1114.41).
195. See supra notes 118–22, 145–50 and accompanying text. Under the TCA, a manufacturer must
obtain a new permissive SE or PMTA new product order before marketing a substantially changed
version of a tobacco product that has been legally on the market (unless the substantial change does not
raise new or different questions of public health, such as threatening to increase youth use or reduce user
cessation). TCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31, sec. 101 § 907(a), § 907(c), § 905(j) 123 Stat. 1776 (2009)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387j(a), § 387j(c), § 387e(j) (2012)). A U.S. district court has ruled that only
substantial changes to an existing tobacco product’s physical characteristics, as opposed to changes to its
labeling (or, presumably, to its packaging or advertising), can trigger the TCA’s requirement that
manufacturers must obtain a permissive new-product order, even if the latter changes raise different
questions of public health. Philip Morris v. FDA, 202 F. Supp. 3d 31, 51 (D.D.C. 2016).
196. See supra notes 183–184 and accompanying text.
197. Proposed PMTA Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. at 50,610.
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[H]ealth risks of the tobacco product to both users and nonusers of the
product and whether the tobacco product presents less health risk than
other tobacco products . . . [t]he impact the product and its marketing
will have on the likelihood of changes in tobacco use behavior of
tobacco product users, including cessation, switching (i.e., to a
different tobacco product), and poly use (i.e., using the new tobacco
product in conjunction with one or more other tobacco products) . . .
[and] on the likelihood of tobacco use initiation by tobacco products
nonusers, especially youth and young adults, including among never
users and former users, and the likelihood of poly use and switching
behaviors.198
Presumably, FDA would not specifically require this information if it were not
going to consider all of it when making its future PMTA AFPPH
determinations.199
Going further, the Proposed Rule “recommends” (but does not require) that
PMTA applications “include estimates of the effect that the new tobacco product
may have on the health of the population as a whole, such as effects on tobacco
use initiation switching and cessation, and reductions in premature mortality, or
increases in life-years lived” and states that applicants “may” assess the net
public heath impact by “weighing” the potential reductions in disease risks from
users of more harmful products switching to the new product against the potential
increases in disease risks from nonusers using the new product (and, although
unsaid by FDA, presumably from other harm-increasing uses of the product, as
well) and “should provide quantitative assessments in the concluding discussion
whenever possible.”200
It is troubling, however, that the Proposed Rule does not take the logical
next step of also requiring applicants to develop these kinds of quantitative
198. Id. at 50,583. See also id. at 50,605–06 (providing additional text showing FDA’s awareness of
all the many consumer behaviors that could impact the net public health impact from allowing the
marketing of a PMTA tobacco product). Similarly, the Final PMTA Guidance recommends that
applicants provide a summary that describes “the likelihood” that nonusers will initiate or reinitiate
tobacco use through the new product, that users of the new product will move on to potentially more
harmful tobacco use or engage in dual use, or that current users will use the new product instead of
quitting all tobacco use or using an FDA-approved cessation product. Final PMTA Guidance, supra note
12, at 24, 37–38. However, while the Final PMTA Guidance documents list of possible different health
impacts on different types of consumers goes further than those considered in the Snus and IQOS
Decision Summaries, it still leaves out some relevant responses (e.g., users of less-harmful tobacco
products switching to the new product, youth or adults initiating into using the new product instead of
into using a more-harmful or less-harmful product, or uses of the new product that do not prevent but
delay total cessation or cessation of more-harmful product use). The Guidance also does not explain how
the consumer behavior likelihoods presented in the application should or could be translated into
likelihoods of harms and benefits and any final determinations of net public health impacts.
199. As previously described, however, FDA’s Swedish Match Snus and Philip Morris IQOS PMTA
Decision Summaries did not mention or discuss all of these possible impacts from allowing those
products’ marketing.
200. Proposed PMTA Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. at 50,583–84 (emphasis added).
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estimates through the types of modeling described previously to estimate bestand worst-case scenarios, which are likely necessary for any “not arbitrary or
capricious” AFPPH determinations (i.e., to determine in a reasonable way that
the potential new public health gains from allowing the PMTA product’s
marketing sufficiently outweigh the possible new public health harms).201 FDA
clearly understands the benefits of such modeling, which it has supported for its
own uses.202 In addition, the Decision Summaries for the IQOS and Swedish
Match snus PMTA Orders and the snus MRTP Order critiqued some similar
models provided in the applications for projecting future impacts from the
marketing of the products and, especially for the PMTA models, described how
they could have been made much more useful to FDA.203 Yet the Proposed
PMTA Rule or Final PMTA Guidance do not require any such modeling by
applicants, nor do they suggest that FDA will do any such modeling or estimates
on its own.204
VII. CONCLUSION
It is quite possible that FDA orders allowing the Philip Morris IQOS or
Swedish Match snus products (or other tobacco products) onto the U.S. market
or to be marketed with MRTP claims could be AFPPH and “not arbitrary or
capricious.” But the PMTA and MRTP orders FDA has actually issued were
“arbitrary and capricious” and were not AFPPH for both procedural and
substantive reasons.205 So why did FDA present such sloppy, vague, and
incomplete analyses and issue such overly permissive, under-protective orders?
Given the lack of any reassurance in the Final PMTA Guidance or Proposed
PMTA Rule that FDA will correct these inadequacies in the future, trying to
answer this question becomes even more relevant and important.
The leadership and staff at FDA’s Center for Tobacco Products (CTP) who
either do the PMTA and MRTP analyses or review and approve them were

201. See supra notes 42, 40, 105 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Apelberg et al., supra note 42.
203. Snus PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 32 (“it would have been useful if the
applicant had provided a clearer description of the model and its use . . . [and] had provided additional
information to aid in the interpretation of model analyses and results . . . in order to facilitate an
evaluation of the plausibility and relevance of these scenarios for the U.S. population”); Snus MRTP
Decision Summary, supra note 45, at 43.
204. The Guidance’s only reference to any modeling of the possible consumer behaviors in response
to the marketing of the PMTA product is a passing reference to how FDA has received meeting requests
related to marketing applications pertaining to a range of topics, including such modeling, which in
many cases has resulted in the submission of more complete applications. Final PMTA Guidance, supra
note 12, at 51. The proposed PMTA rule makes no mention of modeling at all.
205. As noted earlier, while released after this paper was in near-final form, it appears that FDA’s
22nd Century PMTA Order and IQOS PMTA Order, and their underlying Decision Summaries have the
same flaws that have been detailed in this article relating to the Snus MRTP Order (and the underlying
Snus PMTA Order) and the IQOS PMTA Order.
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certainly fully aware of all the different ways the marketing of new tobacco
products would increase individual and public health harms and risks. Yet the
decision summaries and orders did not discuss or even mention all such impacts.
In addition, many of the CTP personnel certainly knew how modeling can be
done, despite inevitable uncertainties, to provide insightful, evidence-based bestcase and worst-case projections of future public health impacts based on expertbased estimates or ranges or estimates of how harmful different ways of using
the product might turn out to be and the range of different ways consumers might
respond to their marketing. Yet, despite doing such modeling in other areas, FDA
did not require or apparently do any such modeling relating to the IQOS or snus
applications to develop an adequate understanding of the relative likelihood and
size of the possible individual and public health harms and risks versus harm and
risk reductions from the products’ marketing. The CTP leadership and staff were
also well aware of many different possible, legally viable restrictions and
requirements that could be placed on tobacco products or their labeling,
marketing, or sale to prevent and reduce exposure and use by youth and nonusers
and otherwise discourage harm-increasing product use and encourage harmreducing use. Yet FDA included only partial, inadequate provisions in the final
Swedish Match and IQOS PMTA and MRTP Orders.
Given the considerable knowledge and expertise of CTP staff, the most
disturbing possible explanation for FDA’s failings with the PMTA and MRTP
Final Orders would be if non-public-health concerns came into play, such as
White House pressure to allow the products on the market with minimal
restrictions or requirements for ideological or political reasons, or a desire by
government lawyers to avoid threatened legal challenges from Philip Morris or
Swedish Match if their applications were not successful or the final orders were
too restrictive. Or perhaps FDA thought that having the snus and, especially,
IQOS on the market as smoking substitutes with MRTP claims (despite no
clearly articulated justification for doing so) would weaken industry arguments
against a future FDA rule to sharply reduce smoking and would make it easier
for FDA to get permission from the White House and the Office of Management
& Budget (OMB), at long last, to issue such a rule (e.g., by reducing nicotine
levels in cigarettes).
Or perhaps, FDA believed that it would not be able to implement any strong
new anti-smoking rules in the foreseeable future (e.g., because of political and
bureaucratic constraints and the many years that can be required to get through
the rulemaking and clearance processes, overcome inevitable tobacco industry
legal challenges, and finally implement and enforce the rule).206 Seeing that path
206. Indeed, despite having extensive tobacco control authorities since 2009, FDA has yet to
implement a substantive tobacco control rule that would significantly reduce tobacco use or its harms in
the United States because of political and bureaucratic obstacles and either a lack of support or direct
opposition from the Administration.
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blocked or overly long, perhaps FDA decided that its best chance for tobacco
control progress was to allow on the market any reasonable less-harmful tobacco
products that did not seem especially attractive to youth and hope that market
competition between the less-harmful products and smoked tobacco products
would secure new public health gains, despite the large downside risks. But FDA
could hardly explain any such politically strategic analysis, even if accurate, to
justify its AFPPH determinations.
It could also be that strategic, political, or bureaucratic factors, or goodfaith disagreements among FDA’s public health experts, have prevented FDA
from being able to determine exactly how it wants to interpret and apply the
remaining gray areas of the AFPPH standard and, without a clearly articulated
standard to apply, FDA’s PMTA and MRTP analyses had to be somewhat vague
and conclusory.
Along these lines, FDA might also have realized that developing any
reasonable interpretation of the protective AFPPH standard in the PMTA and
MRTP contexts and rigorous applying it would make it much more difficult for
FDA to allow any new products on the market or permit any reduced-risk or
reduced-exposure claims. But if FDA did not readily allow any new products or
claims that could make it more difficult for FDA to implement its preferred
tobacco control strategies, increase political or bureaucratic interference,
intensify attacks by the tobacco industry and its allies, and possibly prompt
Congressional action to try to weaken the Act’s standards and authorities.
Similarly, FDA might have realized that, even without a clearly articulated
AFPPH standard, any comprehensive and transparent evaluation of the
likelihood and size of all the new health harms and risks created by allowing the
new products or MRTP claims compared to the likelihood and size of the new
harm and risk reductions from the orders would also make allowing the products
or claims much more difficult – producing the same strategic and political
problems.
However, even if FDA had clearly articulated and rigorously applied a
legally viable AFPPH standard and done a comprehensive, not-arbitrary-orcapricious evaluation of the applications, it is quite likely that it could have still
issued legally valid PMTA and MRTP orders for the IQOS and snus products.
But to do that, FDA would have had to include sufficient restrictions and
requirements in each final order to prevent or reduce unnecessary new health
harms and risks and minimize the likelihood and size of any possible net public
health loss (at least to the extent that could be done without disproportionately
reducing the likelihood or size of the net public health gain). But political or
bureaucratic pressures or obstacles might have interfered with FDA’s
willingness or ability to do that. For example, it is possible that the generally
anti-regulation Trump White House and OMB did not support or permit FDA
efforts to include more comprehensive new restrictions or requirements in the
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PMTA or MRTP orders, especially as putting such restrictions and requirements
on these less-harmful products would indicate that new regulations should be
implemented to place the same or stronger restrictions or requirements on moreharmful tobacco products, as well.207
Less political explanations are also possible for FDA’s inadequate
evaluation of the Swedish Match and IQOS PMTA and MRTP applications and
its excessively weak Final Orders. But having inadequate resources or being
pressed for time cannot be used as an excuse. FDA’s Center for Tobacco
Products has hundreds of qualified staff members to help review and evaluate
the applications or do related research and analysis, and the agency receives
generous funding to support its efforts to regulate tobacco products through
firmly established mandatory industry user fees.208 Nor are there serious time
constraints that might explain rushed and incomplete FDA evaluations or orders.
Although the TCA says that FDA must review PMTA applications and issue
final orders within 180 days, the clock does not start until FDA considers the
application complete and FDA can also restart the clock whenever the
applications are amended or new information is requested or provided by the
applicant.209 And, the TCA sets no deadline for how quickly FDA must consider
MRTP applications.210
Another largely procedural problem, however, could have been in play that
would explain much of FDA’s shortcomings. Although not articulated in the
order documentation or elsewhere, it appears that the staff in the Office of
Science at FDA’s Center for Tobacco Products who do the work that is described
in the PMTA and MRTP decision summaries have chosen or been told to focus
primarily on evaluating just the information and analysis provided in the
applications to see if that application-focused evaluation produces any reason not
to issue a favorable order. The IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, for example,
207. See, e.g., id.; Exec. Order No. 13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,
82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13777, Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda,
82 Fed. Reg. 12285 (Feb. 24, 2017) (providing examples of the Trump Administration’s generally antiregulation approach); See, e.g., supra note 16; Emily Baumgaertner, The FDA Tried to Ban Flavors
Years Before the Vaping Outbreak – Top Obama Officials Rejected the Plan, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2019),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-10-01/vaping-flavors-obama-white-house-fda; Katie
Thomas & Sheila Kaplan, E-Cigarettes Went Unchecked in 10 Years of Federal Inaction, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/health/vaping-e-cigarettes-fda.html.
208. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS
COMMITTEES 211 (2019) (showing 886 full-time equivalent Center for Tobacco Product employees in
FY 2018). See id. at 23; TCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31, sec. 101 § 919(b) 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified at
21 U.S.C. 387s(a) (2012)) (establishing industry users fees of $712 million per year for FY 2019 and
future years).
209. TCA, sec. 101 § 910(c)(1) (codified at 21 U.S.C. 387j(c)(1)). For example, the initial Philip
Morris PMTA application was submitted on May 15, 2017, with twelve listed subsequent amendments,
and FDA issuing its final order on April 30, 2019 (more than 700 days later). IQOS PMTA Decision
Summary, supra note 29, at 1, 2; IQOS PMTA Order, supra note 45, at 1.
210. See TCA, sec. 101 §911 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 387k).
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mentions some independent literature reviews done by FDA and makes various
findings based on available evidence or information, but they always pertain to
issues or questions raised by the application.211 In addition, very little is done in
any of the decision summaries to raise and carefully consider important issues or
questions not presented by the application, itself (even if they have been raised
in formal comments submitted to FDA by interested parties).212 In this way,
FDA’s review procedure appears to allow the application to curtail the scope of
FDA’s AFPPH analysis. Rather than require the application to provide all the
information, analysis, modeling, and proposed restrictions and requirements on
the product and its marketing and sale necessary to provide for an adequate
AFPPH evaluation and to show that granting a PMTA order could be AFPPH—
and look to externally available evidence and analysis if it does not—FDA seems
to look primarily at the information, assertions, and analysis the application has
chosen to provide (with some requests for additional related information by
FDA) to see if the application, itself, reveals any clear reason it should be
denied.213
FDA’s errors and omissions in its PMTA and MRTP Orders for the
Swedish Match snus and Philip Morris IQOS products, and its parallel failures
to clarify what manufacturers must establish in their future PMTA applications,
is enormously troubling given the large number of applications from e-cigarette
and other tobacco product manufacturers that will likely be submitted to meet
211. See, e.g., IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 11, 32, 56, 58, 65, 76, 83–84, 93–
96, 98. But some references to the available evidence appear to apply only to evidence supplied by the
applicant. See, e.g., id. at 11, 32, 84. In addition, other FDA findings or conclusions appear based only
on the applicant-provided information. See, e.g., id. at 61, 94.
212. For example, early text in the IQOS PMTA Decision Summary states that: “All relevant
information submitted to the agency, including information from the MRTPAs, the TPSAC meeting on
the MRTPAs and the public comments to the MRTPAs, to the extent relevant to the PMTAs, has been
considered in review of these applications.” IQOS PMTA Decision Summary, supra note 29, at 14. But
FDA does not anywhere mention any general FDA application-review procedure, practice, or attempt to
identify and consider relevant issues or questions not raised by the applicant. See id. Moreover, key
issues pertaining to the PMTA application raised in submitted MRTP comments were not discussed in
the Decision Summary. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Eric Lindblom, Dir., Tobacco Control and Food
& Drug Law, O’Neill Inst. for Nat’l & Glob. Health Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., to U.S. Food &
Drug Admin. Ctr. for Tobacco Products (May 30, 2018),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2017-D-3001-0202 (raising issues regarding the
potential new health harms and risks from users of e-cigarettes moving to IQOS and the need for any
permissive order to include certain restrictions and requirements to prevent unnecessary individual and
public health harms and risks). See also supra notes 107–08, 130–131 and accompanying text.
213. Such an odd approach could come from a tragic misreading of the TCA’s text which states that
FDA shall deny an application for a PMTA order “if, upon the basis of the information submitted to
[FDA] as part of the application and any other information before [FDA] with respect to such tobacco
product, [FDA] finds that—(A) there is a lack of a showing that permitting such tobacco product to be
marketed would be appropriate for the protection of the public health.” TCA, sec. 101 § 911(c)(2)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. 387j(c)(2)). But that text clearly means to put the burden of proof on the
applicant, not to restrict FDA’s review to only those facts, assertions, and analyses the application
presents.
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the court-established September 2020 deadline for all e-cigarettes and other postdeeming tobacco products currently on the market to submit PMTA applications
if they want to continue being sold.214 In addition, FDA already has several
pending MRTP applications that present the exact same kinds of challenges for
FDA.215 If FDA handles these PMTA and MRTP applications similarly to how
it handled the Philip Morris and Swedish Match PMTA and MRTP applications,
the agency will again fail to protect the public health.
To be fair to the industry, comply with the requirements of the TCA and
the APA, and work effectively to protect and promote the public health, FDA
needs to eliminate the remaining ambiguities about what the AFPPH standard
requires PMTA and MRTP applications to establish. Regardless of how FDA
clarifies that standard (or if it does not), FDA should clearly announce to the
industry and other interested parties (with related instructions to the FDA staff
who evaluate the applications) that PMTA and MRTP applications, to be
successful, must at a minimum:
1. Establish that the product is significantly less harmful and risky to
users than at least some other tobacco products currently on the market
(or at least that it is quite likely that it is less harmful, with little or no
risk that it might turn out to be more harmful) – and also show that all
available steps have been taken to make the product as minimally
harmful and risky as possible without interfering with its ability to
serve as a substitute for more harmful tobacco product use.216
2. Propose any restrictions or requirements on the product or its
labeling, packaging, marketing, sale, or use that are necessary to
eliminate or minimize any risk or producing a net harm to the public
health or that will otherwise prevent or reduce any new harms from
the marketing of the product that are not necessary to secure larger net
public health gains.217
3. Provide convincing evidence and analysis that the likelihood and
size of all the different ways the marketing of the subject product with
those restrictions and requirements could increase health harms and
214. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
215. Modified Risk Orders, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 24.
216. For example, the applicant would have to justify including any additive in the new tobacco
product unnecessary for its delivery of nicotine to users that is a harmful or potentially harmful
constituent (or creates any such constituent during the product’s use) by showing that including the
additive would be highly likely to increase harm-reducing uses of the product, thereby securing related
health gains that were significantly larger than any new health harms the additive might cause by
prompting harm-increasing uses of the product.
217. For examples of possible restrictions or requirements that applicants might propose (or FDA
might mandate), see supra notes 149–160 and accompanying text.
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risks are significantly (or substantially) smaller than the likelihood and
size of the reduced harms and risks from the product being used as a
complete substitute for smoking or other more-harmful tobacco
product use.218
These criteria would ensure that FDA’s review of PMTA and MRTP
applications would be much more comprehensive and effective than its review
of the Swedish Match snus and Philip Morris IQOS applications. They would
also work regardless of how FDA might (or might not) clarify the AFPPH
standard. But they might be made somewhat more specific depending on how
FDA clarified the standard (e.g., by indicating roughly how much smaller the
estimated risk and size of possible negative net public health impacts must be
than the estimated likelihood and size of the expected net public health gains).
To expedite matters, keep the burden of proof on the applicants, and reduce
its own review burdens, FDA could also make it clear that it will not only
evaluate applications based primarily on these three criteria but will immediately
reject any applications that do not at least exhibit a good-faith effort to comply
with them (rather than provide the applicants with opportunities to amend or
supplement their applications or exercise FDA’s own authority to fix deficient
applications by including restrictions or requirements in the order that the
applicant did not propose). In addition, FDA could publish a list of those
restrictions or requirements it has determined or believes are necessary
components of any PMTA or MRTP because they will prevent and reduce harmincreasing uses of the product while still allowing for or supporting harmreducing uses.219
Applying these criteria, FDA should also recall and reevaluate the
inadequately supported and insufficiently protective PMTA and MRTP orders it
has already issued, providing the manufacturers with a reasonable opportunity to
amend or supplement their applications, accordingly.

218. Going further, FDA could require applicants to provide their best-case, worst-case, and mostlikely estimates, with supporting evidence and analysis, of: (a) the product’s harmfulness when used by
otherwise nonusers or by smokers (or other more harmful tobacco product users) using the product
through either dual use or as a complete substitute; and (b) all the various ways youth and adult nonusers
and users of other tobacco products might respond to the product’s marketing that could increase or
reduce health harms and risks. That would make it much easier for FDA to develop its own expert,
application-based high, low, and most likely estimates of those impacts, which it could then use as
inputs for either informal or more detailed modeling to develop projections of the possible worst, best,
and most-likely net public health impacts from allowing the product’s marketing – thereby making it
possible for FDA to make “not arbitrary or capricious” AFPPH determinations.
219. See Eric N. Lindblom, How Would an Ethically Responsible FDA Evaluate PMTA and MRTP
Applications and Issue Related Orders 75 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 1–38 (2020) (providing a detailed
analysis of how FDA might interpret and apply the AFPPH standard in the context of PMTA and MRTP
applications and how it might structure any permissive PMTA or MRTP applications to best promote
and protect the public health, with a special focus on e-cigarette PMTA or MRPT applications).
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Unless or until FDA takes such steps to provide a sufficient basis for
determining that issuing a PMTA or MRTP is AFPPH, its orders allowing new
tobacco products on the market will risk being legally challenged and overturned
by the courts. Legal challenges could come not only from members of the public
health community (who have successfully challenged other FDA tobacco control
actions and inactions) but from manufacturers or importers of products that must
compete against the tobacco products inappropriately allowed on the market or
allowed to make MRTP claims by FDA. The absence of industry legal challenges
to date might be due, in part, to competitors not wanting to bring lawsuits that
could make it more difficult for them to obtain PMTA or MRTP orders for their
own products in the future or that could increase the likelihood that FDA would
include more restrictions and requirements in any future permissive PMTA or
MRTP orders they might be able to secure for their products.
Why no public health organizations have yet brought legal challenges is
less clear. Perhaps, like FDA, they see the Swedish Match Snus PMTA and
MRTP Orders as simply not raising big enough individual or public health risks
to worry about or to allocate scarce resources to oppose. Or some might think
that having IQOS on the market as a smoking-alternative with the MRTP claims
could be beneficial despite the risks of harm-increasing uses, as well. But future
MRTP PMTA orders allowing e-cigarettes legally on the market or allowing
them to be marketed with MRTP claims could present much larger and likely
health threats which are more likely to be realized if FDA does not structure its
orders appropriately. It is also possible that the public health groups have not
previously had a detailed analysis of the procedural and substantive
shortcomings of the FDA’s permissive PMTA and MRTP evaluations and orders
to date that unnecessarily threaten the public health. But now they do.

